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ABSTRACT 
 Historically the United States has welcomed immigration from all over the 
world; from Ellis Island to the Statue of Liberty, whose iconic “Mother of Exiles” is 
considered a symbol of hope to generations upon generations of immigrants.  In the last 
few years there has been an increase in hostility towards immigration but more precisely 
towards unauthorized immigration. This has caused several states to enact anti-
unauthorized immigration measures. States such as South Carolina, Utah, Alabama, have 
all followed Arizona, which was the first state to enact such a laws. Unauthorized 
immigrants typically vacate three labor areas, construction, food service, and agriculture. 
The following thesis tries to detail House Bill 56, which is Alabama’s anti-unauthorized 
immigration bill, and its impact on the construction industry in Alabama. 
House Bill 56 was passed by the Alabama House of Representatives, the 
following research shows that it has negatively affected the construction industry in 
Alabama. Alabama has three major indexes that detail the overall “health” of the 
construction industry. They are employment rates, Construction GDP, and Construction 
Spending. Since the passage of HB 56, all three construction indexes in Alabama have 
encountered significant negative changes. A survey of sub-contractors in Alabama 
shows that there is a negative construction labor pool, with most of sub-contractors 
blaming the passage of HB 56 as the culprit. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
 The introduction of the Beason-Hammon Alabama Taxpayer and Citizen 
Protection Act in the state of Alabama commonly referred to as Legislation House Bill 
56 or HB 56; has created a firestorm of outrage and support nationwide. Proponents of 
the law mainly Alabama’s Republican led Senate and House of Representatives have 
touted it as a positive step towards eliminating the onslaught of unauthorized 
immigration, and the economic burden which unauthorized immigration creates. While 
immigration support groups state that HB 56 is a step backwards in time. Back to a time 
when Jim Crow laws governed the land, but are now directed towards the unauthorized 
immigrant population. Legislation House Bill 56 was first read to the Alabama House of 
Representatives on March 3, 2011; and consequently signed into law on July 9 of 2011. 
The law was scheduled to take effect September 1, 2011, but legal actions taken by the 
Presidential Administration (Obama Administration), derailed its commencement. The 
Presidential Administration managed to block certain facets and aspects of the law, but a 
federal ruling on September 29, 2011, sustained the majority of the law, and 
subsequently it proceeded to go into effect. The main provisions of the passed  law are as 
follows: 
 Allows local law enforcement to demand papers from anyone they deem to be in 
the country illegally.(ACLU, 2013) 
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 Makes it a crime for undocumented immigrants to hold a job in Alabama, and 
make it a crime for any immigrant in the state to be caught without 
documentation proving status, with deportation or full prosecution of law. 
(ACLU, 2013) 
 Makes it unauthorized to sign a contract with undocumented immigrants, to 
knowingly rent property to them, to knowingly hire them for jobs. (ACLU, 2013) 
 Require businesses to use E-Verify, the government database of names, to check 
employees’ legal status. (ACLU, 2013) 
 Mandates parents to report immigration status of their children to public. 
 This Legislation is a singular law to the State of Alabama. (ACLU, 2013) 
 Legislation House Bill 56 does not clearly delineate its ulterior purpose in the 
verbiage of the law, yet one can easily infer that the purpose of the law is to eliminate, or 
reduce the numbers of unauthorized immigrants that currently reside in the state of 
Alabama. Furthermore there has been little research or analysis performed that details 
the impact of the law on the construction economy in Alabama. 
1.2 Statement of the Problem 
Through analysis of various facets of the construction industry, the proposed 
study will identify and analyze how, and to what extent, House Bill 56 has impacted the 
construction industry in Alabama. 
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1.3 Research Objectives 
This study is intended to analyze and validate the impact of Legislation HB 56 on 
the construction industry in Alabama. This will be accomplished by mixed 
methodologies, combining both quantitative and qualitative research methodologies. 
The research objectives are: (1) to explore the impact of HB 56, through a 
quantitative analysis of Construction Employment Rates, Construction GDP, and 
Construction Spending, and (2) a qualitative analysis of six (6) construction trades, and 
determine the impact of House Bill 56 in Alabama through a phone survey.  
1.4 Null Hypothesis 
 Null Hypothesis 1 
There has been no significant change in the construction employment rates in 
Alabama since the passage of HB 56. 
Null Hypothesis 2 
There has been no significant change in Construction GDP in Alabama since the 
passage of HB 56. 
Null Hypothesis 3 
There has been no significant change in Construction spending rates in Alabama 
since the passage of HB 56. 
Null Hypothesis 4 
There has been no significant change in the construction employment rates in 
Alabama since the passage of HB 56, as compared to other states of pre-determined 
similarity. 
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Null Hypothesis 5 
There has been no significant change in the Construction GDP rate in Alabama 
since the passage of HB 56, as compared to other states of pre-determined similarity. 
Null Hypothesis 6 
There has been no significant change in Construction Spending rates in Alabama 
since the passage of HB 56, as compared to other states of pre-determined similarity 
1.5 Limitations 
 The research will focus on the impact on the construction industry in Alabama by 
House Bill 56; it will not be an analysis of the body and verbiage of the law.  
1. Modeling data will be gathered from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the U.S 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, and the U.S Census Bureau. 
2. The quantitative assessment will be a one-time survey, with no follow up 
interviews. 
3. The research time frames will encompass one (1) year pre legislation and one (1) 
year post legislation.  
4. Construction GDP and Construction Spending data is given as a yearly amount, 
and not as a monthly value, like Employment Rates. 
1.6 Delimitations 
1. The qualitative portion of the study focuses directly the following sub-
contractors trades: 
a. Concrete 
b. Masonry 
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c. Drywall 
d. Painting 
e. Flooring 
f. Roofing 
 1.7 Definitions of Terms 
Construction: the construction sector comprises establishments primarily 
engaged in the construction of buildings or engineering projects (e.g., highways and 
utility systems). Establishments primarily engaged in the preparation of sites for new 
construction and establishments primarily engaged in subdividing land for sale as 
building sites also are included in this sector.  Production responsibilities for 
establishments in this sector are usually specified in (1) contracts with the owners of 
construction projects (prime contracts) or (2) contracts with other construction 
establishments (“Census.gov” 2006). Construction for the purposes of this study will 
adhere to three main branches: Commercial, Industrial, and Residential Construction 
(Construction spending, 2013). 
Unauthorized Immigrant: an alien (non-citizen) who has entered the United 
States without government permission or stayed beyond the termination date of their 
respective visa (Anti Essays, 2011). 
Construction Gross Domestic Product: GDP measures the monetary value of 
final goods and services—that is, those that are bought by the final user—produced in a 
country in a given period of time (typically quarters of a year). It counts all of the output 
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generated within the borders of a country. GDP is composed of goods and services 
produced for sale in the market and also include some nonmarket production, such as 
defense or education services provided by the government (The Robinson Rojas 
Archive, 2012). 
Construction Spending: is an economic indicator that measures the amount of 
spending towards new construction. It is released monthly by the U.S. Department of 
Commerce's Census Bureau; it looks at residential and non-residential construction in 
the private sector, and state and federal at the public level (Construction spending, 
2013). 
Construction Employment Rates: the number of persons who have jobs, 
expressed as a percentage of the total workforce. The employment rate is not used as 
commonly as the unemployment rate but it is still an important indicator of the state of 
the wider economy. It is a lagging indicator; that is, following a recession, the 
employment rate tends not to grow to any significant extent until the remainder of the 
economy has recovered (BLS (B) statistics, 2010). 
Construction Unemployment Rates: the unemployment rate measures the 
percentage of employable people in a country's workforce who are over the age of 16 
and who have either lost their jobs or have unsuccessfully sought jobs in the last month 
and are still actively seeking work (BLS (A) statistics, 2010). 
Self-Perform: self-performing contractors use their own labor force to 
accomplish a portions of a construction project, particularly critical path components 
such as steel erection, concrete work, and carpentry. A self-performing contractor brings 
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qualified labor, specialized equipment, and building expertise to a project (McCarthy, 
2013). Only about 25 percent of general contractors have the capabilities to self-perform 
(Bolen, 2007). Since the amount of General Contractors who self-perform is so small, 
study will only focus on sub-contractors who self-perform all their work. 
Sub-Contractor: an individual or business firm contracting to perform part or all 
of another's contract (Mirriam-Webster, 2011). 
1.8 Significance of Study 
The purpose of this study is to identify the impact of Legislation House Bill 56, 
on construction by looking at three (3) facets of the construction industry in the state of 
Alabama.  The research is designed to help individuals understand the impact of laws 
that affect either positively or negatively the construction industry. By understanding the 
effects of the law, the research will provide a platform for informed decision-making 
regarding laws, which affect construction such as House Bill 56. Moreover, this research 
will be helpful to the construction industry, and its affiliates, informing them of the 
“human impact” of House Bill 56. 
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2. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE 
2.1 Overview 
The literature review focuses of nine areas: (1)history of immigration patterns in 
the United States, (2)what drives unauthorized immigration, (3) an overview 
demographically of areas in the United States where unauthorized immigrants are 
settling,  (4) history of immigration laws,  (5) the fiscal impact of unauthorized 
immigration; (6) the development of legislation directly opposing unauthorized 
immigration and analysis of states that are implementing anti-unauthorized immigrant 
laws; (7)analysis of employment areas directly affected by unauthorized immigration in 
the United States as a whole, and analysis of areas adversely affected by targeted 
unauthorized immigration legislation in Alabama, (8) an overview of employment for 
unauthorized immigrants in the construction field in Alabama, and (9) cost and benefit 
analysis of Legislation House Bill 56. The purpose of the literature review is to chronicle 
unauthorized immigration from a broad spectrum to the topic of study; the approach in 
the literature review is one of an inverted pyramid. The present review is limited, to data 
available as projections from various trusted entities. It is important to inform the reader 
that unauthorized immigrant population is not numerically specific; this is due to the 
fearfulness of unauthorized immigrants to participate in data collection mechanisms, 
such as the Census or polling. Fortunately the there are three entities that track and give 
estimates of the unauthorized immigration population, the U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, Center for American Progress (CRS) and the Pew Hispanic Research Center 
(Addy, 2012). 
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2.2 History of Immigration 
 Immigration has been synonymous with the United States since its inception and 
it’s arguably one of its founding ideals and principles. There have been major waves of 
immigration to the United States, either entering the country legally or illegally. 
Immigrants have come for a myriad reasons, some economic, some religious, some 
social, and some political. Philip Martin and Elizabeth Midgley from the Population 
Reference Bureau (PRB) have chronicled the four major waves of immigration to the 
United States:  
1. Pre 1820 
2. From 1820-1860, which brought about 7.5 million immigrants.  
3. From 1881-1914. 
4. From 1965-present, where half are from Latin America.  
Throughout this entire time there have been many evolutions of laws to both restrict 
and invite immigration flow; the latter parts of the literature review addresses many of 
these laws. 
2.2.1 First Wave: Before 1820 
The first wave of immigrants arrived before entries began to be recorded in 1820. 
The English made up 60 percent of the immigration population in 1790, but there were 
also Scottish, Scots-Irish, Germans, Dutch, French, and Spaniards. These immigrants 
were motivated by a mixture of religious, political, and economic factors. German 
sectarians sought religious freedom in Pennsylvania; Spaniards looked for Christian 
converts in Florida and the southwest; and the Puritans in Massachusetts sought to 
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establish a community restricted to members of their faith. Religious freedom was made 
possible by political and economic freedom; the absence of coercion by overlords and 
the chance to prosper in a new land (Population Reference Bureau, 2003). One-third of 
immigrants arriving in 1776 had become indentured servants to secure passage. This 
process of immigration denotes that even in the early days of immigration, a large 
percentage of the immigration population was compromised of laborers. Which to this 
day still holds factual. 
2.2.2 Second Wave: 1820 to 1860 
The second wave of immigrants, who arrived between 1820 and 1860, fit well 
with Americans’ eagerness for people to help settle the frontier. Peasants displaced from 
agriculture and artisans made jobless by the Industrial Revolution were desperate to 
escape from Europe. New arrivals sent what came to be called “American letters” back 
to Europe, encouraging friends and relatives to join them. Steamship and railroad 
companies sent agents around Europe recruiting customers. Between 1820 and 1840, 
more than 7,500,000 German, British, and Irish immigrants arrived; another 4.3 million 
came from those countries during the next 20 years. About 40 percent of these second-
wave immigrants were Irish escaping extreme poverty and famine in their home country. 
Roman Catholics predominated in the second wave, and by 1850 the Roman Catholic 
Church was the largest denomination in the United States, though Protestants of various 
denominations outnumbered Catholics (Population Reference Bureau, 2003). 
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2.2.3 Third Wave: 1880 to 1914 
The third wave of immigration started in 1880, when almost 460,000 immigrants 
arrived, and ended with the outbreak of war in Europe in 1914, when 1.2 million 
immigrants entered. During the third wave, over 20 million southern and eastern 
Europeans came, mostly to the Eastern and Midwestern states. Several hundred thousand 
Chinese, Japanese, and other Asian laborers settled in the Western states. The shift in 
national origins can be seen by comparing the homelands of the immigrants who entered 
during 1882 and 1907, two peak immigration years (Population Reference Bureau, 
2003). The immigrants who arrived in 1907 also included the first large numbers of 
people of Jewish and Eastern Orthodox religions. By the early 1900s, the frontier was 
closed, and most newcomers found factory jobs in eastern and Midwestern cities. More 
than 1 million immigrants arrived annually in six of the first 14 years of the 20th 
century. By 1910, foreign- born residents accounted for nearly 15 percent of the U.S. 
population and about 24 percent of the U.S. labor force; immigrants made up more than 
fifty (50) percent of all operatives in mining, steel, and meatpacking. Foreign- born men 
made up more than half of the work force in some of the major US cities, like New 
York, Chicago, and Detroit (Population Reference Bureau, 2003). 
2.2.4 Immigration Pause: 1915 to 1964 
Immigration ceased as World War I erupted in Europe. When immigrants began 
to arrive again after the war, in the 1920s, their entry was curtailed by the introduction of 
numerical limits, or “quotas.” Then the severe economic depression of the 1930s 
discouraged foreigners moving to the United States. As Adolf Hitler’s Nazi regime 
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displaced and threatened Jews and political opponents in Europe and precipitated 
another world war, many called on Franklin D. Roosevelt’s administration to give more 
generous treatment to those fleeing Nazi-controlled areas (Population Reference Bureau, 
2003). Yet the United States did not admit large numbers of refugees until after World 
War II. Including the refugee flows, an average of 250,000 immigrants entered each year 
through the 1950s. During the 1940s and 1950s, immigration from Mexico and other 
Western Hemisphere nations became increasingly important. In the 1940s, about one-
third of the 1 million immigrants whose arrivals were recorded were from the Western 
Hemisphere. The Western Hemisphere share climbed to 40 percent in the 1950s. Legal 
immigrant admissions did not reflect the volume of Western Hemisphere immigration, 
because many migrants were unauthorized. Between1940 and 1960, for example, 
360,000 legal Mexican immigrants were admitted but, in 1954 alone, more than 1 
million Mexicans were apprehended and sent back as illegal entrants. Since relatively 
few of the unauthorized Mexicans became permanent settlers, the Mexican-origin 
population during that time frame rose very slowly (Population Reference Bureau, 
2003). 
2.2.5 Fourth Wave: 1965 to Present 
Fourth-wave immigrants began arriving in the United States after 1965, when the 
preference system changed. Instead of giving priority to immigrants based on their 
national origins; with preference to those from northern and Western Europe, the new 
system gave priority to people with U.S. relatives and to a small number of people with 
outstanding accomplishments or special skills. These changes, coupled with prosperity 
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in Europe, altered the composition of U.S. immigrants. During the 1970s, the first 
decade the law was in effect; fewer than 20 percent of U.S. immigrants were Europeans. 
There are many similarities between immigration at the beginning of the 20th century 
and at the start of the 21st. During both periods, the economy was undergoing 
fundamental restructuring, from agriculture to industry in the early years of the 20th 
century and from services to information at start of the 21st century. Both waves brought 
people from countries that had not previously sent large numbers of immigrants, raising 
questions about language, religion, and culture (Population Reference Bureau, 2003). 
 In turn the majority of immigration to the US since 1965 has been primarily 
from Latin America, with Mexico having the greatest numbers. Latin American 
countries compromise five (5) of the top ten (10) source countries of unauthorized 
resident immigrants; Figure 1  below depicts the number of unauthorized immigrants 
entering the United States and their country of origin for the years, 2000 and 2010: 
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Figure 1: Top Ten Source Countries of Unauthorized Immigrants. Source: CRS Presentation of American 
Community Survey Data, Analyzed by Michael Hoefer, Nancy Rytina, and Bryan Baker (2012) 
 
 
The data points to the country, which is the primary engine of illegal immigration 
to the United States since 1965, Mexico.  
2.3 Driving Forces 
 It is very difficult to pinpoint exactly the reasons as to why unauthorized 
immigrants leave their respective country of citizenship to come to the Unites States 
either by entering illegally, or by entering legally with visas and simply overstaying their 
time authorization. The Public Policy Institute of California states has narrowed it down 
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to one (1) main reason why unauthorized immigrants come to the United States, which is 
the economic pull.  
2.4 The Economic Pull 
Political controversies aside, when unauthorized immigrants come, many U.S. 
employers are ready to hire them. Estimates suggest that at least 75% percent of adult 
unauthorized immigrants are in the workforce. Male unauthorized immigrants have 
particularly high labor force participation rates, with more than 90 percent in the 
workforce. Wage and employment levels in the United States are much higher than in 
immigrants’ home countries. For example, the average U.S. wage for production 
workers in manufacturing is about nine times higher than in Mexico, a ratio that has 
changed very little in over two decades. (Johnson & Hill, 2011) 
One of the factors that have exacerbated unauthorized immigration is the ease 
with which unauthorized immigrants can get a job, due to the inefficiency of U.S. 
government in sanctioning employers that hire illegal immigrants. There are three main 
reasons why employer sanctions are ineffective. The first reason is that there does not 
seem to be a reliable method for verifying employment eligibility. Although there have 
been sanctions in place since the passage of the Immigration Reform and Control Act 
(IRCA) of 1986 for knowingly hiring an illegal alien, the law only requires that 
employers determine the eligibility of the worker on the basis of whether or not the 
documents presented to them appear to be authentic. The law does not require employers 
to verify whether the documents presented are actually authentic. Given the lax nature of 
the law on this matter, illegal immigrants have found it easy to obtain counterfeit 
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documents and employers have found it easy to comply with the law simply by 
determining those documents to be authentic. Some states have required the use of E-
Verify, an internet-based program that compares a potential employee’s documents with 
U.S. government records. Unfortunately, the program is not sophisticated enough to 
detect whether or not the documents are a result of identity fraud, and might therefore be 
increasing the value of stolen identity data as a means for an unauthorized individual to 
gain employment. Secondly, U.S. government has spent very little to increase funding 
interior investigations, especially when compared to the overall enforcement budget. 
Although border enforcement is needed to control illegal immigration, decreasing the 
economic incentives to work illegally in the U.S. is a legitimate concern that has not 
really been addressed. Thirdly, there is concern over national sovereignty and violations 
of U.S. law, which prompts increased spending to stop illegal border crossing. There is 
also a desire to maintain strong economic performance, which causes concern over the 
disruption of economic activity made possible by illegal labor. In an effort to balance 
these interests, the U.S. government has focused enforcement at the border rather than at 
the worksite. Despite increased funding to secure the border between 1987 and 2002, 
however, the continual increase in illegal immigration suggests that the economic 
incentive to immigrate illegally is still very powerful. (Wright, 2011) 
2.5 Unauthorized Immigrant Settlement Demographics 
Figure 2, from the US Department of Homeland Security depicts the 
unauthorized immigrant population in the United States from 2000 through 2011. 
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Figure 2: Unauthorized Immigrant Population from 2000 to 2010. Source: U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security 
 
 
More importantly DHS also shows the number of unauthorized immigrants 
percent change per state. Table 1, from DHS has very specific number for ten (10) states 
and the remaining states are coupled together.  
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Table 1: Unauthorized Immigrant Change from 2000 to 2010. Source: U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security 
 
Number of Unauthorized Immigrants in the U.S & Per State 
 Year Year Percent Change Number Change 
State of 
Residence 
 
2011 
 
2000 
 
2000 to 2011 
 
2000 to 2011 
All states 11,510,000 8460000 36% 280,000 
California 2,830,000 2510000 12% 30,000 
Texas 1,790,000 1090000 64% 60,000 
Florida 740,000 800000 -8% 10,000 
New York 630,000 540000 18% 10,000 
Illinois 550,000 440000 26% 10,000 
Georgia 440,000 220000 95% 20,000 
New Jersey 420,000 350000 19% 10,000 
North Carolina 400,000 260000 53% 10,000 
Arizona 360,000 330000 9% -- 
Washington 260,000 170000 51% 10,000 
Other States 3,100,000 1750000 77% 120,000 
 
 
2.5.1 Workforce 
There were 8 million unauthorized immigrants in the workforce in March 2010, 
down slightly from 2007, when there were 8.4 million. They represent 5.2% of the 
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workforce, similar to their proportion for the past half-decade, when they represented 
5% to 5.5% of workers. State patterns differ widely, but generally states with large 
numbers or shares of unauthorized immigrants also have relatively large numbers or 
shares in the workforce.  
States with the largest share of unauthorized immigrants in the workforce include 
Nevada (10%), California (9.7%), Texas (9%) and New Jersey (8.6%). Because 
unauthorized immigrants are more likely than the overall population to be of working 
age, their share in a state’s workforce is substantially higher than their share of a state’s 
population. (Pew Hispanic, 2011) 
The Center for American Progress (CAP) is an independent nonpartisan 
educational institute has separately from the Department of Homeland Security 
monitored the settlement patterns of unauthorized immigrants. They state that the: 
traditional “gateway” states such as California, Illinois, Texas, New York, and Florida 
still continue to be home to large percentages of our nation’s foreign-born. But 
immigrants are increasingly dispersing17 to metropolitan areas outside these states. 
Fifteen states: Alabama, Arkansas, Colorado, Delaware, Georgia, Idaho, Kentucky, 
Minnesota, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico, North Carolina, Tennessee, South 
Carolina, and Utah experienced at least a two-hundred (200) percent increase in their 
immigrant populations between 1990 and 2009. (American Progress Team, 2012) 
2.6 Recent History of Immigration Law 
Immigration to the United States soared between 1970 and 2006, and has been 
shaped by the introduction of fourteen major bills; the most impactful bills will be 
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addressed in the following text (Giovanni, 2011).  The Immigration and Nationality Act 
of 1965 abolished the national-origin quota system and replaced it with a framework 
emphasizing the importance of family ties. This new policy environment led to a 
substantial increase in the flow of immigrants. Following the first oil crisis, Congress 
became more restrictive, approving in 1973 H.R. 392 and H.R. 891. The first bill H.R 
392, provided for employer sanctions to tackle the growing employment of 
undocumented immigrants. The second extended instead the applicability of the 20,000 
per-country cap to migrants from the Western Hemisphere. This measure was designed 
to limit immigration from Mexico (Facchini & Steinhart, 2011). The IRCA or 
Immigration Reform and Control Act failed to stem the problem of undocumented 
immigrants entering the U.S. In order to address this concern, the Unauthorized 
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act: H.R. 2202, which was 
introduced in 1996. Besides increasing the size of the U.S. Border Patrol, the bill 
mandated the construction of a fence along the most heavily trafficked areas of the U.S.–
Mexico border. Furthermore, it designated a pilot program to check the job applicant's 
immigration status. The act also made the deportation of unauthorized immigrants 
substantially easier. Importantly, it restricted access to federal and state benefits to all 
immigrants, legal or unauthorized. The law that preceded the Arizona Immigration Law 
SB1070 and Alabama’s House Bill 56, was the controversial Border Protection, Anti-
terrorism, and Unauthorized Immigration Control Act of 2005: H.R. 4437. Its major 
provisions were the creation of a U.S.–Mexico border fence up to 700 miles long and 
federal custody of locally detained unauthorized immigrants. Furthermore, the bill 
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imposed a fine of $3000 on all unauthorized immigrants captured in the U.S., who had 
previously agreed to leave the country voluntarily. It also provided for up to 5 years 
imprisonment for any person supporting or hosting undocumented immigrants (Fetzer, 
2006). Since the bill was highly controversial, while it passed the U.S House of 
Representatives, it did not clear the U.S Senate.  
2.7 Fiscal Impact of Unauthorized Immigration 
There are various key issues regarding the monetary or fiscal impact of 
unauthorized immigration by determining if unauthorized immigrants receive more in 
social services than what they pay for in taxes. Unauthorized immigrants incur costs on 
the government that range from emergency health services, and matriculation in publics 
schools. Measuring the fiscal impact of unauthorized immigrants has yielded a range of 
competing estimates. As a result, though an exact monetary value cannot be discerned, it 
appears that illegal immigrants impose an overall fiscal cost, a cost that is concentrated 
at the state and local levels (Ramanujan, 2009).  
2.7.1 Public Service Costs 
 In examining the use of public services by illegal immigrants, three distinct costs 
stand out:  
1. Health care, 
2. Education  
3. Incarceration/Detention.  
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2.7.2 Healthcare 
 Though the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act 
(IIRIRA) of 1996 barred illegal immigrants from most public services, federal law 
continues to provide illegal immigrants with access to emergency medical services and 
assistance for pregnant women and infants. However, since maternity/infant assistance is 
given not only to a mother, but also for the benefit of US citizen children, the largest 
unilateral health cost that illegal immigrants impose is by way of emergency care. In 
terms of education, the Supreme Court decision Lau v. Nichols (1974) held that the 
rights of non-English-speaking students were violated when public schools did not take 
steps to teach them the language of instruction (Ramanujan, 2009). Furthermore, the 
case of Plyler v. Doe (1982) guaranteed illegal immigrant children public education. As 
a result, public schools are required to provide education to all students regardless of 
immigration status and are prohibited from requiring proof of status. The final major 
source of public costs stemming from illegal immigration comes from incarcerating 
those illegal immigrants who commit crimes while in the US. Before looking at studies 
that have measured the fiscal costs of illegal immigrants, it is important to examine the 
extent to which illegal immigrants are prone to use public services. Specifically, in terms 
of gender distribution, 4.9 million or (56%) percent of undocumented immigrants are 
adult males, 3.9 million or (37.5% ) percent are adult females and 1.6 million or (15.4%) 
percent are undocumented children (Passel, 2005). Research on general trends in 
immigrant families indicates that immigrants are less likely than natives to use public 
services. An additional fear of being discovered by the immigration authorities could 
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potentially deter undocumented immigrants from utilizing public services. For example, 
a 2000 Health Affairs study determining health-care use among undocumented 
immigrants found that they are far less prone to use any health-care service available to 
them when compared with the resident population (Nadadur, 2009). Regardless of their 
alleged propensity to shy away from public services, figures indicate that illegal 
immigrants do utilize those services available to them. In looking at estimates of health 
care, for example, a comprehensive report released by the Center for Immigration 
Studies (CIS) in 2004 estimated that households headed by illegal immigrants create 
health-care costs totaling $658 million yearly at the federal level by imposing a 
significant burden on Medicaid and uncompensated emergency care. A similar study 
released by the Federation of American Immigration Reform (FAIR) held that, in 2004, 
uncompensated medical care accounted for $1.4 billion in illegal immigrant costs on. 
Since these studies focus on entire households, they do not necessarily account for the 
fact that a significant portion of this service benefits US citizen children and is, thus, not 
a fiscal cost imposed by illegal immigrants directly. Another important study released by 
the Urban Institute in 1995 showed aggregate Medicaid and emergency care costs of 
$445 million annually in the seven states with the highest concentration of 
undocumented immigrants. These seven states are: California, New York, New Jersey, 
Texas, Florida, Illinois and Arizona. Although the study was undertaken before 1996 
legislation barred illegal immigrants from significant health-care benefits, and the 
monetary value measured has not been adjusted for 10 years of inflation, the range of 
findings that these three studies present indicates that there has not been sufficient 
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consensus regarding the health costs of illegal immigrants. This reflects the conclusion 
reached by a Government Accountability Office (GAO) study which held that ‘until 
reliable information is available on undocumented aliens and the costs of their care, 
accurate assessment of their financial effect on hospitals will remain elusive at best 
(Ramanujan, 2009).  
2.7.3 Education 
 The CIS estimate released in 2004 indicated that education costs $371 million 
per year at the federal level. The estimate, however, did not include state-level 
expenditures on education which account for the majority of education costs. In looking 
at state-level costs, the 2004 FAIR study found that illegal immigrants impose a $3.2 
billion yearly cost on education in California. As noted before, these studies focus on 
household expenditures and do not take into account US citizen children as part of 
illegal immigrant households. Finally, the Urban Institute study of 1995 found that 
education was the highest public expenditure that illegal immigrants imposed, 
accounting for a total of $3.08 billion dollars in the seven states surveyed, with 
California bearing a burden of $1.3 billion annually (Ramanujan, 2009). 
2.7.4 Incarceration/Detention 
 In examining incarceration costs, a study released by the Urban Institute in 2000 
based on the initial estimates of the 1995 study indicated that 14,262 illegal immigrants 
were identified among state prisoners in 1995 from California, Texas, New York, 
Florida, Illinois, Arizona and New Jersey. Based on the costs of housing single 
prisoners, the total cost of incarcerating illegal immigrant prisoners was $474.2 million 
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per year in the seven states, with California facing a cost of $367.7 million. The 2004 
FAIR study, on the other hand, reported that incarceration cost California alone $1.4 
billion in 2003 (Ramanujan, 2009). 
2.8 Anti-Illegal Immigration Legislation 
 There has been an increasing development of legislation directly opposing 
unauthorized immigration. Many states have move to enact laws that are targeted 
towards the elimination of unauthorized immigration. This development of increased 
legislation has been driven by the Arizona’s SB 1070; which in 2010 was considered the 
harshest anti-unauthorized immigration law in the nation. In present time Alabama’s HB 
56 is touted to be the nation’s harshest law. Figure 3 below graphically depicts the states 
that have also copy-catted or enacted laws like HB 56 and like SB 1070. (Center for 
American Progress Team, 2012) 
  Arizona  
 Utah 
 Georgia 
  Indiana 
 Alabama 
 South Carolina 
 All these states have enacted immigration enforcement laws that target 
unauthorized immigrants and increase the authority of local police to enact immigration 
enforcement policies. The passage of these measures has undoubtedly created a deeply 
hostile climate for all people of color, citizen or not. The Center for American Progress 
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have plotted some of the damages created by these laws, as well as a country wide 
diagram of the states that have passed or might pass laws similar to HB 56. 
2.8.1 Arizona 
 Arizona S.B. 1070 was enacted April 2010, if fully implemented and all 
undocumented immigrants were driven from the state: Employment would drop by 17.2 
percent, 581,000 jobs would be eliminated for immigrant and native-born workers alike, 
the state economy would shrink by $48.8 billion, and state tax revenues would be 
reduced by 10.1 percent (American Progress Team, 2012). 
2.8.2 Georgia 
 Georgia’s H.B. 87 was enacted in April 2011. The law has already caused severe 
labor shortages as workers and their families avoid the unwelcoming state. The state lost 
an estimated $300 million in un-harvested crops with a total possible statewide impact of 
$1 billion in 2011 alone (American Progress Team, 2012).  
2.8.3 Alabama 
 Alabama’s H.B. 56, the nation’s toughest immigration law, was passed in June 
2011. Though a federal court has put a temporary hold on many of the most severe 
provisions of the law, an Alabama district judge allowed some extreme measures to go 
into effect in the fall of 2011, causing much damage to the state’s economy, society, and 
reputation. It’s estimated that the state economy will lose up to $10.8 billion (6.2 percent 
of its GDP) and up to 140,000 jobs (American Progress Team, 2012). 
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2.8.4 Utah, Indiana, and South Carolina 
 Have all passed anti-immigrant measures in the spring of 2011. The bills signed 
into law in all three states include Arizona-style enforcement provisions (American 
Progress Team, 2012). 
Copycat States
 
 
Figure 3: Copycat States. States with legislation similar to HB 56. Source: Center for American Progress 
 
 
2.9 Affected Areas 
 According to the U.S Bureau of Economic Analysis and Center for Business and 
Economic Research, there are three main employment sectors that have the highest 
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concentration of unauthorized immigrants in the United States: they are agriculture, food 
services and construction. In Alabama specifically the breakdown in the unauthorized 
construction labor force percentage is 40.9%. 
Table 2, shows in thousands the number of workers in the construction industry 
as a whole. 
 
 
Table 2: Employments Rate, in Alabama Per Year. Source: U.S Department of Labor Statistics 
Total Construction Employment (Alabama) per Year 
State 2009 
Year Avg. 
2010 
Year Avg. 
2011 
Year Avg. 
 
2012 
Jan. 
Alabama 91.7 87.2 78.9 70.1 
 
 
2.10 Unauthorized Immigrants in Construction 
By looking at the total construction employment rate, and looking at the 
percentage of unauthorized immigrants working in construction, then it can be inferred 
that unauthorized immigrants hold roughly (37,500) jobs. Table 2 taken from the U.S 
Department of Labor Statistics, shows clearly seen that there has been a change in the 
construction employment rate. The U.S Department of Labor also shows that the average 
weekly hours worked, average hourly earnings, and average weekly earnings have 
decreased substantially since the passage of the law (table 3). 
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Table 3: Average Hours & Earnings Construction Employees, Alabama. Source: Alabama Department of 
Labor 
 
Construction Earnings Per Month (Alabama) 
 Average weekly hours   Average hourly earnings    Average weekly earnings 
State Sep. 
2011 
Aug. 
2012 
Sep. 
2012 
Sep. 
2011 
Aug. 
2012 
Sep. 
2012 
Sep. 
2011 
Aug. 
2012 
Sep. 
2012 
Alabama 43.4 40.9 40.7 19.6 20.51 20.30 850.64 838.86 826.21 
 
 
By looking U.S Department of Labor Statistics Data, since the end of 2009 until 
September of 2011, Alabama has lost in ($390,774,489) dollars in personal earnings. If 
the entire unauthorized immigrant population was to vacate all construction jobs the 
impact of personal earnings would be in the range of ($1,658,982,436) dollars. The 
research also shows that the majority of the unauthorized construction labor force is 
made up of six (6) trades; they are as follows: concrete, masonry, drywall, painting, 
flooring, and roofing. (Golden, and Skibniewki, 2010) 
2.11 Cost Data Analysis of HB 56 
 Professor Samuel Addy, from at the University of Alabama concludes that the, 
“the law’s economic costs include implementation, enforcement, and litigation 
expenditures; increased costs and inconveniences for citizens, other legal residents, and 
businesses; fewer economic development opportunities; and the economic impact of 
reduced aggregate demand as some unauthorized immigrants leave and therefore no 
longer earn and spend income in the state (Addy, 2012). The annual economic and fiscal 
impacts of the reduction in aggregate demand caused by 40,000-80,000 unauthorized 
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immigrant workers who earn in the range of $15,000 to $35,000 annually leaving the 
state are reductions of about: 
1. 70,000-140,000 jobs with $1.2-5.8 billion in earnings 
2. $2.3-10.8 billion in Alabama Gross Domestic Product (GDP)  
3. 1.3-6.2 percent of the state’s $172.6 billion GDP in 2010 
4. $56.7-264.5 million in state income and sales tax collections 
5. $20.0-93.1 million in local sales tax collections (Addy, 2012).  
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3. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology approach to the research is designed to analyze and validate 
the impact of Legislation HB 56 on the construction industry in Alabama. This will be 
accomplished by mixed methodologies, combining both quantitative and qualitative 
research methodologies. 
3.1 Quantitative 
• Employment Rates:   U.S Department of Labor Statistics 
• Construction GDP:  U.S Bureau of Economic Analysis 
• Construction Spending:     U.S Census Bureau 
 State Pre-Determination: 
 In order to determine the states that are used in the employment rate, construction 
GDP, and construction spending comparatives, a filtering system was designed to 
eliminate states that did not compare similarly to Alabama in the following manner: 
1. Share of Illegal Immigration labor force as a percent of entire population for 
2010. (Appendix A ) 
2. Similar Construction GDP per State for 2009 & 2010. (Appendix B ) 
3. Since Alabama passed HB 56, the filter was looking at states that had neither 
passed nor brought to vote legislation similar to HB 56. (Appendix C ) 
  
32 
 
3.1.1 Results of State Filter 
 The states that managed to meet all the baseline requirements to be comparable 
to Alabama are as follows: 
1. Colorado 
2. Connecticut 
3. Oregon 
 All these states met the needed criterion to create a comparable baseline. Each 
state will be compared to Alabama, individually, in employment rates, construction 
GDP, and construction spending. All modeling data will be gathered from the 
Department of Labor Statistics, Bureau of Economic Analysis, and The U.S. Census 
Bureau. See Appendix A, B, and C for state filter breakdown. 
In the quantitative methodology three sub-groups will be used to perform the 
statistical analysis; T-Tests of the data will be used to determine significant change: 
3.2 Sub-Groups 
 Sub Group 1: Employment Rates: 1 year pre legislation, 1 year post law 
• Alabama T-Test Equal Variance 
• Alabama vs. Colorado T-Test Unequal Variance 
• Alabama vs. Connecticut T-Test Unequal Variance 
• Alabama vs. Oregon T-Test Unequal Variance 
 Sub Group 2: Construction GDP: 2010 & 2011 
• Alabama: 2010 & 2011 T-Test Equal Variance 
• Alabama vs. Colorado: 2011 T-Test Unequal Variance 
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• Alabama vs. Connecticut: 2011 T-Test Unequal Variance 
• Alabama vs. Oregon: 2011 T-Test Unequal Variance 
 Sub Group 3: Construction Spending: 2010 & 2011 
• Alabama: 2010 & 2011 T-Test Equal Variance 
• Alabama vs. Colorado: 2011 T-Test Unequal Variance 
• Alabama vs. Connecticut: 2011 T-Test Unequal Variance 
• Alabama vs. Oregon: 2011 T-Test Unequal Variance 
3.2.1 Why Employment Rates 
Employment rates were chosen for statistical analysis, since companies count 
unauthorized immigrants as part of their work force. While unemployment rates are 
typically derived from the number of unemployment claims, per state per labor field; 
unauthorized immigrants cannot claim unemployment, as their unauthorized status does 
not allow them to do so.  
3.2.2 Why T-Test 
• There are two samples from two populations. (The samples can be different 
sizes.)  
• The two samples are independent.  
• Both populations are normally distributed or both sample sizes are large enough 
that the means are normally distributed. 
• Both population and their perspective standard deviations, σx and σy, are 
unknown, but are assumed to be not equal.  
• Once the p-value is known, compare it to α(0.05), the significance level. 
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3.2.3 Why Unequal Variance Test 
• The unequal variances test can be used even if the variances are equal. If the 
variances are equal, it is not as powerful as the pooled variance test, but it is the 
safe option. 
3.3 Qualitative 
 Construction companies were found on the Licensed Contractors listing at the 
Alabama.gov website. 
 Phone Survey 
o 6 Sub-Contractor trades: 10 participants per trade 
o Concrete, masonry, drywall, framing, flooring, painting. 
o IRB Protocol #: IRB2012-0753 
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4. ALABAMA 
 The first part of the research will analyze the impact HB 56 had on the 
employment rates in construction for Alabama. The second part of the data gathering 
and analysis will focus on Construction GDP, while the third part of the data gathering 
and analysis will focus on Construction Spending 
 A similar type of format will be applied when comparing Alabama vs. the three 
pre-determined states. 
4.1 Alabama Employment Rates: Data Gathering 
Data analysis will be performed by looking at the time frame spanning from July 
2010 to July 2012. This time frame was selected to show the employment rates at one (1) 
year pre and one (1) year post the passage of the legislation. Since the passage of the 
law, is a phased event, the data will show the impact of House Bill 56 throughout four 
(4) parts. 
 Part 1: Graphical representation of the employment rates one (1) pre and 
one (1) post legislation (figure 4). 
 Part 2: Employment data for second half of 2010 
 Part 3: Employment data for entire 2011 
 Part 4: Employment data for first half of 2012 
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Figure 4: Construction Employment Rates, Alabama: July 2010 to June 2012. Source: U.S. Department of 
Labor Statistics 
 
 
Part 2: The employment construction rate in Alabama from July 2010 until 
December 2010 fell from 87,500 to 83,500 thousand. This show that the construction 
employment rates in Alabama shrunk in the second half of 2010 by a total of 4000 jobs. 
The data shows that Alabama employment rate was decreasing at a rate of close to 800 
jobs per month for that six (6) month span (table 4).  
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Table 4: Construction Employment rates, Alabama: July 2010 to December 2010. Source: U.S 
Department of Labor Statistics 
  
Construction Employment Rates for Alabama 
July 2010 until December 2010 (Thousands) 
Month July August September October November December 
Rate 87.5 87.0 86.3 85.9 84.8 83.5 
 
 
 
Part 3: The first half of 2011 shows that although regression occurs from January 
until June the regression is minimal (table 5). From January to February the employment 
rates actually increased. By plotting the data of the first half of the year, it shows a trend 
of stability, which the previous six (6) did not show. It shows almost a plateau, in which 
employment rates kept at a consistently steady for the entire 6 months. The second half 
of the year shows a significant change in employment rates (table 6). From July to 
December the employment rate dropped by 3800 jobs. The signing into law of 
legislation HB 56, occurred on July 3rd 2011, it can be seen immediately see that a 
downward trend began in the number of workers being employed (table 6). This is also 
verified by the steady plateau in the number of employment rates that the state had in the 
first six (6) months of 2011(table 5).   
 
 
Table 5: Construction Employment Rates, Alabama: January 2011 to June 2011. Source: U.S Department 
of Labor Statistics 
  
Construction Employment Rates for Alabama 
January 2011 until June 2011 (Thousands) 
Month January February March April May June 
Rate 81.1 82.0 81.8 81.0 81.0 80.0 
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Table 6: Construction Employment Rates, Alabama: July 2011 to December 2011. Source: U.S 
Department of Labor Statistics 
  
Construction Employment Rates for Alabama 
July 2011 until December 2011 (Thousands) 
Month July August September October November December 
Rate 79.4 77.7 78.0 76.4 74.4 75.6 
 
 
Part 4: From January of 2012 to June of 2012, the construction employment rate 
in Alabama continued to regress. A loss of 1200 jobs for the first half of 2012, 
cumulative the total loss since July 2011 (passage of HB 56) was 6800 jobs (table 7). 
 
Table 7: Construction Employment Rates, Alabama: January 2012 to June 2012. Source: U.S Department 
of Labor Statistics 
  
Construction Employment Rates for Alabama 
January 2011 until June 2012 (Thousands) 
Month January February March April May June 
Rate 73.8 74.8 73.4 72.5 73.9 72.6 
 
 
4.2 Alabama Employment Rates: Analysis and Results 
The initial step is a T-Test analysis shows that there has been a significant 
change in the employment rates one-year pre legislation to one-year post legislation.  
Table 8 shows that overall the construction employment rates have had significant 
changes since July of 2010. From July 2011, until June of 2012, the employment rate 
dropped 6,800 jobs. Numerically since the initial passage of the law Alabama has 
experienced a total reduction in the entire construction employment rate of 9.36%.   
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Table 8: T-Test Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances: 1 Year Pre to 1 Year Post legislation. 
 
Null Hypothesis: There has been no change in the employment rate in Alabama 1 year 
pre to 1 year post 
  1 year pre 1 year post 
Mean 83.492 75.208 
Variance 7.199 5.006 
Observations 12.000 12.000 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0.000 
 DF 21.000 
 t Stat 8.213 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.00020 
 t Critical two-tail 2.080   
Reject Null Hypothesis: P Value is smaller than 0.05 
 
 
4.3 Alabama Construction GDP  
 The second part in the analysis of HB 56 on the construction industry in Alabama 
is derived from looking at the construction GDP. Gross domestic product by state is 
measured in millions of current dollars.  GDP by state is the value added in production 
by the labor and capital located in a state. 
 For example GDP by metropolitan area is the amount of the market value of all 
final services and goods produced within a metropolitan area annually. In concept, an 
industry's GDP by state, referred to as its "value added", is equivalent to its gross output 
(sales or receipts and other operating income, commodity taxes, and inventory change) 
minus its intermediate inputs (consumption of goods and services purchased from other 
U.S. industries or imported).  
 The Bureau of Economic Analysis or BEA prepares GDP by state estimates for 
64 industries. For each industry, GDP by state is composed of three components:  
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1. Compensation of employees 
2. Taxes on production and imports less subsidies 
3. Gross operating surplus 
 BEA prepares estimates of GDP by State in millions of current dollars and of 
real GDP by state in millions of current since (2005) in dollars. BEA gives the total 
current value at the end of the year; BEA does not give monthly, bi-monthly, or 
quarterly, only an annual value.  The estimates of real GDP by state are derived by 
applying national implicit price deflators to the current-dollar GDP by state estimates 
for the detailed industries. These estimates of real GDP by state reflect the 
uniqueness of each state's industry mix, but they do not reflect differences by state in 
the prices of goods and services produced for local markets (“Census.gov” 2006). 
Current dollar GDP by state and the current dollar components of GDP by state 
(compensation of employees, taxes on production and imports less subsidies, and 
gross operating surplus) are presented in millions of current dollars. Looking at the 
construction GDP is an indicative if the state’s economy is growing or is regressing. 
4.4 Alabama Construction GDP: Data Gathering 
 
 
Table 9: Construction GDP Alabama Per Year source: U.S Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
State 2009 2010 2011 
Alabama 7,654 7,617 6,975 
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4.5 Alabama Construction GDP: Analysis and Results  
The reduction in Construction GDP denotes a contraction in the construction 
economy in the state of Alabama. Since GDP in a nutshell measures the final value of 
goods and services, a reduction in GDP is a true indicator in what direction the economy 
is headed; both table 9 and figure 5 depict this.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5 : Construction GDP in Alabama:  2010, and 2011 Source: U.S Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
 
The data shows, that the construction GDP in Alabama has regressed from 
(7,617) to (6,975) in millions of current dollars. This is confirmed by the change in 
the slope intercept; in 2010 it was (-3.083) compared to 2011 in which it was (-53.5). 
The T-Test also shows that there has been a significant change in the GDP in the 
two-year span since the test showed a P Value smaller than (0.05) (table 10) 
.  
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Table 10: T: Test: Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances. Construction GDP 2010 to 2011 
 
Null Hypothesis: There has been no change in the Construction GDP in Alabama from 
2010 to 2011 
  2010 2011 
Mean 7633.9 7269.2 
Variance 123.59 37209.2 
Observations 12 12 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 DF 11 
 t Stat 6.538691 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 4.20E-5 
 t Critical two-tail 2.200985   
Reject Null Hypothesis: P Value is smaller than 0.05 
 
 
4.6 Alabama Construction Spending  
The third part in the analysis of HB 56 on the construction industry in Alabama is 
derived from looking at the Selected Private Nonresidential Construction Put in Place, or 
Construction Spending. The NYU Stern School of Business states that” Economists look 
to construction spending for clues about the overall economy”; while AGC (Associated 
General Contractors of America) state that construction spending indicatives whether 
employers are hiring workers. Econoday states “Construction spending has a direct 
bearing on stocks, bonds and commodities because it is a part of the economy that is 
affected by interest rates, business cash flow and even federal fiscal policy. In a more 
specific sense, trends in the construction data carry valuable clues for the stocks of home 
builders and large-scale construction contractors.”  
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4.6.1 Source of Information 
These statistics are estimated from the sample of projects used to collect monthly 
the value of private nonresidential construction put in place. In the private nonresidential 
survey, owners are asked to report the amount of work done on their projects each month 
until completion.  
4.6.2 Definitions 
 The annual value of construction put in place or Construction Spending is the 
cumulative value of work done on projects active during the year. U.S Census Bureau 
gives the total million-dollar value at the end of the year; the Census Bureau does not 
give monthly, bi-monthly, or quarterly, only an annual value. For this supplement, 
estimates have been made for selected types of construction within some of the major 
categories. These types of construction are defined as follows:  
 Lodging 
 Office 
 Financial 
 Commercial 
 Automotive 
 Sales 
 Food/beverage 
 Retail Stores 
 Health Care 
 Medical Building 
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 Special Care 
 Educational 
 Other Educational 
 Religious 
 Amusement and Recreation 
 
4.7 Alabama Construction Spending: Data Gathering  
 
 
Table 11: Construction Spending Alabama Per Year source: U.S Census Bureau 
 
State 2009 2010 2011 
Alabama 7,659 5,568 2,972 
 
 
4.8 Alabama Construction Spending: Analysis and Results 
 The reduction in the overall construction spending in 2010 came to a total 
reduction of (2,091) millions of dollars or 27.3%. From 2010 to 2011 the drop in 
construction spending totaled (2,596) millions of dollars or 46.6% this is depicted by 
both table 11 and figure 6.  
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Figure 6: Construction Spending Alabama 2010 and 2011. Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
 
 
The T-Test shows a significant change in Construction Spending for Alabama 
from 2010 to 2011. The Null Hypothesis is rejected, as there is a significant change in 
Construction Spending from 2010 to 2011 (table 12). 2011 shows a staggering reduction 
of 46.6%, which is confirmed by the slope intercept lines of the two data sets, 2010 (-
174.25) and 2011 (-216.33). Although Construction Spending was trending downwards 
in 2010, the trend line exacerbated downwards in 2011 by almost 19% more than the 
previous year. 
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Table 12: T-Test Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances: Construction Spending Alabama 2010 to 
2011 
 
Null Hypothesis: There has been no change in the Construction Spending in Alabama 
from 2010 to 2011 
  
Construction 
Spending 2010 
Construction 
Spending 2011 
Mean 6526.3 4161.83 
Variance 394719.8 608401.4 
Observations 12 12 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 DF 21 
 t Stat 8.17 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 5.7E-8 
 t Critical two-tail 2.0796   
Reject Null Hypothesis: P Value is smaller than 0.05 
 
 
4.9 Summary of Findings 
Utilizing construction GDP and Construction Spending; the data clearly 
shows that the economy in Alabama has regressed in 2011. 2010 was a year of 
decline as well, yet 2011 shows an increase in the decline of Construction both in the 
GDP and Spending sectors. The data depicts a definite decrease in the productivity 
and construction industry in Alabama. All three aspects of construction saw a decline 
across the board. With construction Spending seemingly taking the blunt of the 
decrease. It is also important to show that the numerical numbers given of 
Construction GDP and Construction Spending, are annual numbers. So the only way 
to determine is HB 56 has had an impact on the industry is by linking employment 
rates.  Knowing the monthly employment rates numbers allows for a more precise 
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argument as to the impact of HB 56. An even though Alabama was on a downward 
trend, it can be clearly seen from the data four (4) major points: 
1. Since July 2010 to June 2012, Alabama has lost a cumulative 14,900 
construction jobs. 
2. Construction employment rates in Alabama, six (6) months prior to 
HB 56 and it’s signing into law, had a (1,100) jobs reduction; after 
July 2011 Alabama employment rate dropped by (6,800) jobs to June 
2012. A 618% increase in the drop in employment rates. 
3. Alabama’s employment rates significantly dropped by 6800 workers 
since the passage of the law. 
4. Construction GDP in the two-year span decreased by almost 8.5%. In 
2010 it decreased by -0.48% while in 2011 it decreased by -8.43% 
5. Construction Spending in Alabama decreased by 27.3% in 2010, in 
2011 is decreased by 46.6%.  
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5. STATE COMPARISON 
5.1 Alabama vs. Colorado 
 The same concept that was used to determine the effects of HB 56 on Alabama 
will be used to compare the baseline state (Alabama) to three (3) other states. Data 
gathering, analysis, and results will be performed by comparing Alabama vs. State in 
three ways.  
1. Part 1 testing for significant change in employment rates (1) one year pre and (1) 
one year after the passage of the legislation, Colorado. 
2. Test for significant change in Construction GDP for 2011 Alabama vs. Colorado. 
3. Test for significant change in Construction Spending for 2011 Alabama vs. 
Colorado. 
5.2 Colorado Employment Rates: Data Gathering 
 The employment construction rate in Colorado from July 2010 until December 
2010 rose from 113,700 to 144,000 thousand. This show that the construction 
employment rates in Alabama grew in the second half of the year by a total of 300 jobs. 
This growth is a very modest amount, yet the trend line shows stability in the last six (6) 
months. The data shows that Colorado’s employment rate was decreased in August and 
September by 1000 jobs. In the last two months of the year it rose by 1300 jobs. By 
comparing the changes at from July to December, the amount of jobs growth in hiring, is 
0.02%, (table 13).  
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When the two states are compared, it can be seen that although Colorado’s 
employment rate had a menial or no real increase, it grew; compared to Alabama’s rates 
which lost 4000 jobs, or 4.5% of its work force.  
 
Table 13: Construction Employment Rates, Colorado: July 2010 to December 2010. Source: U.S 
Department of Labor Statistics 
  
Construction Employment Rates for Colorado 
July 2010 until December 2010 (Thousands) 
Month July August September October November December 
Rate 113.7 112.9 112.7 113.3 113.2 114 
 
 
From January 2011 until December 2011 just like the previous year, shows the 
employment rates are stabilized. The first half of the year shows a decrease in the overall 
in the employment rates. Although some months show an increase in hiring, by June the 
total difference from January is (-4000) jobs. By plotting the data of the first half of the 
year, it shows a negative trend of hiring reduction, which the previous six (6) did not 
show (table 14). From July to December the employment grew by 2000 jobs (table 15). 
If taken from June to December the increase was 2300 jobs. This growth is starkly 
different from what was depicted by Alabama’s employment rates. Colorado saw 
growth, at the same time that Alabama began to regress. 
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Table 14: Construction Employment Rates, Colorado: January 2011 to June 2011. Source: U.S 
Department of Labor Statistics 
  
Construction Employment Rates for Colorado 
January 2011 until June 2011 (Thousands) 
Month January February March April May June 
Rate 114.4 112.5 112.6 113.1 111.3 110.4 
 
 
Table 15: Construction Employment Rates, Colorado: July 2011 to December 2011. Source: U.S 
Department of Labor Statistics 
  
Construction Employment Rates for Colorado 
July 2011 until December 2011 (Thousands) 
Month July August September October November December 
Rate 110.7 111.8 111.6 111.5 111.1 112.7 
 
 
The start 2012 still denotes an enormous spike in the construction employment 
rates. From December 2011 to January 2012 Colorado increased it employment rates by 
(5400) jobs. The remaining months show variability in the rates, yet it still hovers close 
to the mean for the six (6) months which is 117,500 (table 16). Alabama in the same six 
(6) month span saw a cumulative loss of 1200 jobs. 
 
 
Table 16: Construction Employment Rates, Colorado: January 2012 to June 2012. Source: U.S 
Department of Labor Statistics 
  
Construction Employment Rates for Colorado 
January 2012 until June 2012 (Thousands) 
Month January February March April May June 
Rate 118.1 116.8 116.7 117.7 118.6 117.1 
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5.3 Colorado Employment Rates: Analysis and Results 
The first step was to determine if there was a significant change in the 
employment rate 1 year pre legislation to 1 year post between Alabama and Colorado.  
An initial T-Test was done to see if there has been a significant change in the 
employment rate in Colorado for the two year span (table 17). The data shows while 
Colorado’s construction employment rate has added (3400) jobs; it is still not a 
significant change. We accept the Null hypothesis; there has been no change in the 
construction employment rates in the two year time frame in Colorado. When compared 
to Alabama, Colorado has not had any decrease in their labor force, in the two year time 
frame. Alabama saw a reduction of 14,900 jobs. 
 
 
Table 17: T-Test Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances: Employment Rates Colorado: 1 Year Pre, 1 
Year Post legislation. 
 
Null Hypothesis: There has been no change in the employment rate in Colorado 1 year 
pre 1 year post 
  1 year pre 1 year post 
Mean 112.8417 114.5333 
Variance 1.222652 10.07515 
Observations 12 12 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 DF 14 
 t Stat -1.74345 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.103164 
 t Critical two-tail 2.144787   
Accept the null hypothesis. P value is larger than .05 
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5.4 Alabama vs. Colorado Construction GDP: Data Gathering 
 
 
Table 18: Construction GDP Alabama and Colorado Per Year, Source: U.S Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
State 2009 2010 2011 
Alabama 7,654 7,617 6,975 
Colorado 10,289 9,369 9,462 
 
 
5.5 Alabama vs. Colorado Construction GDP: Analysis and Results 
The data shows, that the construction GDP in 2010 decreased from (10,289) to 
(9,369), a 10% decrease; while in 2011 it grew from (9,369) to (9,462) in millions of 
current dollars a 0.009% increase (table 18 & figure 7).  
 
 
 
Figure 7: Colorado Construction GDP, 2010 to 2011 Source: U.S Bureau of Economic Analysis 
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The T-test shows that there has been a significant change in the Construction 
GDP in Colorado from 2010 to 2011. The Null hypothesis stated that there has been no 
change in Construction GDP in the two year span, since the T-Test analysis shows a P 
Value smaller than (0.05), then the Null Hypothesis is rejected (table 19). 
 
Table 19 : T-Test Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances: Construction GDP Colorado 2010 and 2011 
 
Null Hypothesis: There has been no change in the Construction GDP in Colorado from 
2010 to 2011 
  GDP 2010 GDP 2011 
Mean 9790.6 9419.3 
Variance 76411.1 780.8 
Observations 12 12 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 DF 11 
 t Stat 4.62 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000729 
 t Critical two-tail 2.200985   
Reject Null Hypothesis: P Value is smaller than 0.05 
 
 
 
 The data shows, that the construction GDP in Colorado contracted from 2009 to 
2010 by a total of 8.94%.  It showed a significant growth from 2010 to 2011. This shows 
upwards trending in the construction GDP for the year 2010 and 2011 
By looking at the data for both states construction GDP, both shrunk in 2010, 
by running a T-Test for 2011 of Alabama vs. Colorado the results show a significant 
difference (table 20).  
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Table 20: T-Test Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances: Construction GDP Alabama vs. Colorado 2011 
 
Null Hypothesis: There has been no significant change in Construction GDP of 
Alabama when compared to Colorado in 2011 
  Alabama Colorado 
Mean 7269.25 9419.375 
Variance 37209.25 780.8125 
Observations 12 12 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 DF 11 
 t Stat -38.2137 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000000000000477 
 t Critical two-tail 2.200985   
Reject Null Hypothesis: P Value is smaller than 0.05 
 
 
 
Colorado construction GDP grew in 2011, while Alabama’s contracted 
significantly in 2011. This increase in Construction GDP denotes growth in the 
construction economy in the state of Colorado (figure 8). In 2010 decreased by 
8.94% in 2011 it increased by 1% 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Construction GDP, Alabama vs. Colorado 2011 Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
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5.6 Alabama vs. Colorado Construction Spending: Data Gathering 
 
 
Table 21: Construction Spending Alabama and Colorado Per Year, Source: U.S Census Bureau 
State 2009 2010 2011 
Alabama 7,659 5,568 2,972 
Colorado 4,643 2,751 2,563 
 
 
5.7 Alabama vs. Colorado Construction Spending: Analysis and Results 
Colorado saw a reduction in Construction Spending in 2010 from (4,643) to 
(2,751), while in 2011 Construction Spending continued regressing from (2,725) to 
(2,563). Running a T-Test of this data, the Null Hypothesis was rejected,  there has been 
a significant change in Colorado’s Construction Spending from 2010 to 2011 (table 22). 
 
 
Table 22: T-Test Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances: Construction Spending Colorado 2010 and 
2011 
 
Null Hypothesis: There has been no change in the Construction Spending in Colorado 
from 2010 to 2011 
 
2010 2011 
Mean 3618.1 2649.1 
Variance 323164.1 3190.7 
Observations 12 12 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 DF 11 
 t Stat 5.87 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000107 
 t Critical two-tail 2.20 
 Reject Null Hypothesis: P Value is smaller than 0.05 
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By looking at the slope intercepts for the two years, we can assume that the 
driving force behind the significant change in the Construction Spending came from the 
changes that occurred in 2010. The slope intercepts being (-157.67) in 2010 and (-
15.667) in 2011. Although construction Spending plummeted downwards in 2010, it flat 
lined in 2011 (figure 9). 
 
 
Figure 9 : Colorado Construction Spending, 2010 to 2011 Source: U.S Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
 
The last test determines if there is a significant change in Construction spending 
in Alabama, when compared to Colorado. The T-Test rejects the Null Hypothesis, and as 
such there is a significant change in Construction Spending when the two states are 
compared (table 23)  
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Table 23: T-Test Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances: Construction GDP Alabama vs. Colorado 2011 
 
Null Hypothesis: There has been no significant change in Construction Spending of 
Alabama in 2011 when compared to Colorado in 2011 
 
Alabama Colorado 
Mean 4161.8 2649.16 
Variance 608401.4 3190.77 
Observations 12 12 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 DF 11 
 t Stat 6.70 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 3.37E-5 
 t Critical two-tail 2.20 
 Reject Null Hypothesis: P Value is smaller than 0.05 
 
 
  
Alabama’s construction spending has a slope intercept of (-216.33) while 
Colorado’s has (-15.667) for 2011 (figure 10). Construction Spending in Colorado 
showed little to no change in 2011, it only decreased by (-0.068%). 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10: Construction Spending Alabama vs. Colorado 2011 Source: U.S Bureau of Economic Analysis 
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5.8 Summary of Findings 
Utilizing the employment rates, construction GDP and Construction 
Spending; the data clearly shows that the economy in Colorado has been flat since 
July of 2010. The data shows (4) major points with Alabama’s results below: 
1. Colorado’s employment rates grew by (3,400) workers in the two-
year span. 
 Since July 2010 to June 2012, Alabama has lost a cumulative 
14,900 construction jobs. 
2. Employment rates: From July 2011(Passage of Law) to Jun 2012 
have grown from (110.7) to (117.7).  A (700) jobs increase.  
 After July 2011 Alabama employment rate dropped by (6,800) 
jobs to June 2012.  
3. Construction as part of GDP showed significant change from 2010 to 
2011. In  2010 decreased by -8.94% in 2011 it increased by 1% 
 Construction GDP in the two-year span decreased by almost 
8.5%. In 2010 it decreased by -0.48% while in 2011 it 
decreased by -8.43% 
4. Construction Spending in Colorado showed no significant change 
from 2010 to 2011. Decreased by only (-0.068%) 
 Construction Spending in Alabama decreased by 27.3% in 
2010, in 2011 is decreased by 46.6%.  
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5.9 Alabama vs. Connecticut 
The same methodology used to compare Alabama to Colorado, will be used to 
compare the baseline state Alabama to Connecticut. Data gathering, analysis, and results 
will be performed by comparing Alabama vs. Connecticut in three ways.  
4. Part 1 testing for significant change in employment rates (1) one year pre and (1) 
one year after the passage of the legislation, Connecticut. 
5. Test for significant change in Construction GDP for 2011 Alabama vs. 
Connecticut. 
6. Test for significant change in Construction Spending for 2011 Alabama vs. 
Connecticut. 
5.10 Connecticut Employment Rates: Data Gathering 
The employment construction rate in Connecticut from July 2010 until December 
2010 rose from 50,000 to 51,000 thousand. This shows that the construction employment 
rates in Connecticut grew in the second half of the year by a total of (1000) jobs (table 
24). This growth is a very modest amount, yet the trend line shows plateau like stability 
in the last six (6) months of 2010.  
When the two states are compared, it can be seen that although Connecticut 
employment rate had a menial or no real increase, it grew; compared to Alabama’s rates 
which lost 4000 jobs, or 4.5% of its work force.   
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Table 24: Construction Employment Rates, Connecticut: July 2010 to December 2010. Source: U.S Department of 
Labor Statistics 
  
Construction Employment Rates for Connecticut 
July 2010 until December 2010 (Thousands) 
Month July August September October November December 
Rate 50 50.1 50.1 50.4 50.7 51 
 
 
From January 2011 until December 2011 just like the previous year, shows the 
employment rates are fluctuating within the mean for the year, which are 50,700 
thousand jobs. The standard deviation from the mean of 50,700 for the entire year is 
minimal at .810, which amounts to 810 jobs. The first half of the year shows a decrease 
in the overall in the employment rates. Although some months show an increase in 
hiring, by June the total difference from January is (-400) jobs (table 25). By plotting the 
data of the first half of the year, it shows a negative trend of hiring reduction, which the 
previous six (6) did not show. From July to December the employment again decreased 
by (1600) jobs (table 26).  
The total job loss for the entire 2011 year was (2000) jobs. This reduction in 
employment rates is somewhat similar to Alabama; the difference lies in the percentage 
in job reduction. While Alabama saw a reduction in the employment rates of 4.5%, 
Connecticut saw a reduction of 3.9%.  
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Table 25: Construction Employment Rates, Connecticut: January 2011 to June 2011. Source: U.S 
Department of Labor Statistics 
  
Construction Employment Rates for Connecticut 
January 2011 until June 2011 (Thousands) 
Month January January January January January January 
Rate 51.2 51.7 51.4 50.8 50.9 50.8 
 
 
Table 26: Construction Employment Rates, Connecticut: July 2011 to December 2011. Source: U.S 
Department of Labor Statistics 
  
Construction Employment Rates for Connecticut 
July 2011 until December 2011 (Thousands) 
Month July August September October November December 
Rate 51.6 50.5 49.7 51.3 49.4 49.2 
 
 
The start of 2012 shows a growth in the construction employment rates. From 
December 2011 to January 2012, Connecticut increased it employment rates by (2800) 
jobs. The remaining months show variability in the rates, yet it still hovers close to the 
mean for the six (6) months that is 51,100.  
 
 
Table 27: Construction Employment Rates, Connecticut: January 2012 to June 2012. Source: U.S 
Department of Labor Statistics 
  
Construction Employment Rates for Connecticut 
January 2012 until June 2012 (Thousands) 
 
Month January February March April May June July 
2010 
Rate 52.0 53.1 51.8 49.7 49.9 50.1    50.0 
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5.11 Connecticut Employment Rates: Analysis and Results 
The data shows that in the two-year span Connecticut’s construction employment 
rate has added (100) jobs, from (50.0) in July 2010 to (50.1) in June 2012. This total 
initial and final employment number verifies that Connecticut experienced neither 
growth nor decline in the specified time frame; which is in stark contrast to Alabama’s 
construction employment rate which has consistently decreased.  
The first step in the analysis was to determine if there has been a significant 
change in the employment rate in Connecticut from July 2010 to June 2012. The analysis 
shows that there has been not been a significant change in the employment rates one year 
pre legislation to one-year post legislation; a such the null hypothesis is accepted. Table 
28 shows that overall the construction employment rates have had a little to no change 
since July of 2010. 
 
 
Table 28: T-Test: Two-Sample Assuming Equal Variances: Employment Rates Connecticut: 1 Year Pre, 1 Year Post 
legislation 
 
Null Hypothesis: There has been no change in the employment rate in Connecticut 1 
year pre 1 year post 
  1 year pre 1 year post 
Mean 50.82727273 50.60909091 
Variance 0.252181818 1.590909091 
Observations 11 11 
Pearson Correlation 0.586873984 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 DF 10 
 t Stat 0.690065559 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.505851829 
 t Critical two-tail 2.228138852   
Accept the null hypothesis. P value is larger than .05 
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5.12 Alabama vs. Connecticut Construction GDP: Data Gathering 
 
 
 
Table 29: Construction GDP Alabama and Connecticut Per Year, Source: U.S Bureau of Economic Analysis 
State 2009 2010 2011 
Alabama 7,654 7,617 6,975 
Connecticut 5,944 5,707 5,803 
 
 
 
5.13 Alabama vs. Connecticut Construction GDP: Analysis and Results  
 The data shows, that the construction GDP in Colorado declined from (5,944) to 
(5,707) in 2010; and it grew from (5,707) to (5,803) in 2011 millions of current dollars 
(table 29 and figure 11).  
 
 
 
Figure 11: Construction GDP, Connecticut 2010 to 2011 Source: U.S Bureau of Economic Analysis 
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The T-test shows that there has been a significant change in the Construction 
GDP in Connecticut from 2010 to 2011. The Null hypothesis stated that there has been 
no significant change in Construction GDP in the two year span, since the T-Test 
analysis shows a P Value smaller than (0.05), then the Null Hypothesis is rejected (table 
30). The slope intercept of the data for 2011 shows that it is trending upwards, with a 
slope intercept of (8.0); this shows that 2011 has proven a year of stability in 
construction GDP. 
 
 
Table 30: T-Test Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances: Construction GDP Connecticut 2010 and 
2011 
 
Null Hypothesis: There has been no change in the Construction GDP in Connecticut from 2010 
to 2011 
  2010 2011 
Mean 5815.625 5759 
Variance 5070.813 832 
Observations 12 12 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 DF 15 
 t Stat 2.553109 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.022062 
 t Critical two-tail 2.13145   
Reject Null Hypothesis: P Value is smaller than 0.05 
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Table 31, shows that there is a significant change in Construction GDP 
between Alabama and Connecticut for 2011, typically if the Construction GDP 
shows growth, so will employment rates. This premise is supported by the lack of 
growth in hiring experienced in 2011 in combination with the lack of growth in GDP 
for 2011. 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Construction GDP, Alabama vs. Connecticut 2011Source: U.S Bureau of Economic  
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Table 31: T-Test Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances: Construction GDP Alabama vs. Connecticut 
2011 
Null Hypothesis: There has been no significant change in Construction GDP of 
Alabama when compared to Connecticut 
  Alabama Connecticut 
Mean 7269.25 5759 
Variance 37209.25 832 
Observations 12 12 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 df 11 
 t Stat 26.82329 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 2.25E-11 
 t Critical two-tail 2.200985   
Reject Null Hypothesis: P Value is smaller than 0.05 
 
 
With the general premise that construction GDP is an indicative of how 
construction is behaving, it can be assessed that the economic climate for 
construction in Connecticut is stationary. 
5.14 Alabama vs. Connecticut Construction Spending: Data Gathering 
 
 
Table 32:  Construction Spending Alabama and Connecticut Per Year, Source: U.S Census Bureau 
 
State 2009 2010 2011 
Alabama 10,289 9,369 9,462 
Connecticut 2,725 1,515 1,752 
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5.15 Alabama vs. Connecticut Construction Spending: Analysis and Results 
 Connecticut saw a reduction in Construction Spending in 2010 from (2,725) to 
(1,515), and 2011 from (1,515) to (1,752). The T-tests showed a significant change in 
Construction Spending from 2010 to 2011(table 33).  
 
 
Table 33: T-Test Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances: Construction Spending Connecticut 2010 
and 2011 
 
Null Hypothesis: There has been no change in the Construction Spending in 
Connecticut from 2010 to 2011 
  2010 2011 
Mean 2069.583 1643.375 
Variance 132175.7 5070.813 
Observations 12 12 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 DF 12 
 t Stat 3.985308 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.001809 
 t Critical two-tail 2.178813   
Reject Null Hypothesis: P Value is smaller than 0.05 
 
 
This is confirmed by the slope intercept lines of the two data sets, 2010 (-100.83) 
and 2011 (19.75); and the P Value in the T-Tests. Although Construction Spending was 
trending downwards in 2010, the trend line flat lined upwards in 2011 (figure 13). 
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Figure 13: Construction Spending, Connecticut from 2010 to 2011 Source: U.S Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
 
 
The last test determines if there is a significant change in Construction spending 
of Alabama, when compared to Connecticut for 2011(table 34). The T-Test rejects the 
Null Hypothesis, and as such there is a significant change in Construction Spending 
when the two states are compared. Alabama’s spending for 2011 has a slope intercept of 
(-216.33) while Connecticut has (19.75) (figure 14).  
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Figure 14: Construction Spending, Alabama vs. Connecticut 2011 Source: U.S Bureau of Economic 
Analysis 
 
 
Table 34: T-Test Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances: Construction Spending Alabama vs. 
Connecticut 2011 
 
Null Hypothesis: There has been no significant change in Construction Spending of 
Alabama when compared to Connecticut 
  Alabama Connecticut 
Mean 4161.833 1643.375 
Variance 608401.4 5070.8125 
Observations 12 12 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 DF 11 
 t Stat 11.13853 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 2.49E-7 
 t Critical two-tail 2.200985   
Reject Null Hypothesis: P Value is smaller than 0.05 
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 5.16 Summary of Findings 
Utilizing the employment rates, construction GDP and Construction 
Spending; the data clearly shows that the economy in Connecticut has been flat since 
July of 2010. The data shows (4) major points: 
1. Connecticut employment rates grew by (100) workers in the two year 
span. Accept Null Hypothesis, no significant change in Employment 
Rates. 
 Since July 2010 to June 2012, Alabama has lost a cumulative 
14,900 construction jobs. 
2. Employment rates: From July 2011(Passage of Law) to Jun 2012 
have not had any significant changes, from (51.6) to (50.1).  
 After July 2011 Alabama employment rate dropped by (6,800) 
jobs to June 2012.  
3. Connecticut employment rates grew by (100) workers in the two-year 
span. 
 Since July 2010 to June 2012, Alabama has lost a cumulative 
14,900 construction jobs. 
4. Construction as part of GDP significant change from 2010 to 2011. In  
2010 it decreased by -3.99% decrease, in 2011 it increased 1.68% 
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 Construction GDP in the two year span decreased by almost 
8.5%. In 2010 it decreased by -0.48% while in 2011 it 
decreased by -8.43% 
5. Construction Spending had significant change from in 2010 a -
44.04% decreased, while in 2011a 13.52% increase. 
 Construction Spending in Alabama decreased by 27.3% in 
2010, in 2011 is decreased by 46.6%. 
5.17 Alabama vs. Oregon 
The same methodology used to compare Alabama the previous state, will be used 
to compare the baseline state Alabama to Oregon. Data gathering, analysis, and results 
will be performed by comparing Alabama vs. Oregon in three ways.  
1. Part 1 testing for significant change in employment rates (1) one year pre and (1) 
one year after the passage of the legislation, Oregon. 
2. Test for significant change in Construction GDP for 2011 Alabama vs. Oregon. 
3. Test for significant change in Construction Spending for 2011 Alabama vs. 
Oregon. 
5.18 Oregon Employment Rates: Data Gathering 
The employment construction rate in Oregon from July 2010 until December 
2010 declined from 67,400 to 66,600 thousand. This show that the construction 
employment rates in Oregon declined in the second half of the year by total of (800) jobs 
(table 35). This decline in the employment rate is a very modest amount, and by looking 
at the mean (67,300) and the standard deviation (.357) from the mean; a trend line of 
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stability can be seen. When the two states are compared, it can be seen that although 
Oregon’s employment rate declined in the second part of the year by about 1.2%; 
Alabama’s rates in comparison lost 4.5% of its work force. 
 
Table 35: Construction Employment Rates, Oregon: July 2010 to December 2010. Source: U.S 
Department of Labor Statistics 
  
Construction Employment Rates for Oregon 
July 2010 until December 2010 (Thousands) 
Month July August September October November December 
Rate 67.4 67.6 67.4 67.7 67.2 66.6 
 
 
 
From January 2011 until December 2011 unlike the previous second half 2010, 
the employment rate grew by a total of (2700) jobs or 3.9% (table 36 and 37). The 
employment rate rose by almost (200+) jobs per month; the entire year showed 
consistent growth. When compared with Alabama, it can be seen that while Oregon is 
adding workers to its labor force, Alabama is decreasing them. Oregon gained (2700) for 
the 2011 year, Alabama lost (5500) jobs.  
 
 
Table 36: Construction Employment Rates, Oregon: January 2011 to June 2011. Source: U.S Department 
of Labor Statistics 
  
Construction Employment Rates for Oregon 
January 2011 until June 2011 (Thousands) 
Month January February March April May June 
Rate 67.7 68.0 68.2 68.7 68.9 69.0 
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Table 37: Construction Employment Rates, Oregon: July 2011 to December 2011. Source: U.S 
Department of Labor Statistics 
  
Construction Employment Rates for Oregon 
July 2011 until December 2011 (Thousands) 
Month July August September October November July 
Rate 68.9 68.7 69.6 69.4 69.6 70.4 
 
 
 
The first half of 2012 shows a fluctuation in the employment rates from the mean 
of (69,283). Oregon reduced it hiring from the start 2012 to June 2012 by total of (1500) 
jobs (table 38).  
 
 
Table 38: Construction Employment Rates, Oregon: January 2012 to June 2012. Source: U.S Department 
of Labor Statistics 
  
Construction Employment Rates for Oregon 
January 2012 until June 2012 (Thousands) 
 
Month 
January February March April May June 
July 
2010 
Rate 70.3 68.5 68.4 70.4 69.3 68.8 67.4 
 
 
5.19 Oregon Employment Rates: Analysis and Results 
Table 39 shows that there is a significant change in the employment rate in 
Oregon from one (1) year pre legislation to one (1) post legislation. The data shows that 
there is a significant change, by looking at the total employment rate at the end of the 
time frames it shows that the data points are increasing.  
 The data shows that in the two-year span Oregon’s construction employment rate 
has added (1400) jobs. This total initial and final employment number verifies that 
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Connecticut experienced growth in the specified time frame; which is in stark contrast to 
Alabama’s construction employment rate that has consistently decreased. The data 
shows that since the passage of HB 56, Oregon has lost (100) jobs 
Table 39 T-Test Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances: Employment Rates Oregon: 1 Year Pre, 1 
Year Post legislation 
 
Null Hypothesis: There has been no change in the employment rate in Oregon 1 year pre to 1 
year post 
  1 year pre 1 year post 
Mean 67.86 69.4 
Variance 0.526061 0.526288 
Observations 12 12 
Pearson Correlation -0.28105 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 DF 11 
 t Stat -4.45041 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.000978 
 t Critical two-tail 2.220098   
Reject the null hypothesis. P value is smaller than .05 
 
 
 
5.20 Alabama vs. Oregon Construction GDP: Data Gathering 
 
 
 
Table 40: Construction GDP Alabama and Oregon Per Year source, U.S Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
State 2009 2010 2011 
Alabama 7,654 7,617 6,975 
Oregon 6,409 6,021 6,372 
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5.21 Alabama vs. Oregon Construction GDP: Analysis and Results 
The data shows, that the construction GDP in Oregon declined from (6,409) to 
(6,021) in 2010; and it grew from (6,021) to (6,372) in 2011 millions of current dollars 
(table 40 and figure 15). 
 
 
 
Figure 15: Construction GDP Oregon, 2010 to 2011 Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
 
 
The T-test shows that there has not been a significant change in the Construction 
GDP in Oregon from 2010 to 2011. The Null hypothesis stated that there has been no 
significant change in Construction GDP in the two year span, since the T-Test analysis 
shows a P Value larger than (0.05), then the Null Hypothesis is accept. The test shows 
that any change has been no statistical change in construction GDP in the two year span 
(table 41).   
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Table 41: T-Test Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances: Construction GDP Oregon 2010 and 2011 
 
Null Hypothesis: There has been no change in the Construction GDP in Oregon from 
2010 to 2011 
  2010 2011 
Mean 6198.833 6211.125 
Variance 13590.78 11122.31 
Observations 12 12 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 DF 22 
 t Stat -0.27086 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.789027 
 t Critical two-tail 2.073873   
Accept Null Hypothesis: P Value is larger than 0.05 
 
 
 
By looking at the data for both states construction GDP in 2011, a T-Test 
between Alabama vs. Oregon the results show a significant difference (table 42). 
 
 
Table 42: T-Test Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances: Construction GDP Alabama vs. Oregon 
2011 
 
Null Hypothesis: There has been no significant change in Construction GDP of 
Alabama when compared to Oregon 
  Alabama Oregon 
Mean 7269.25 6211.125 
Variance 37209.25 11122.3125 
Observations 12 12 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 DF 17 
 t Stat 16.67294 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 5.72E-12 
 t Critical two-tail 2.109816   
Reject Null Hypothesis: P Value is smaller than 0.05 
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Oregon’s construction GDP grew in 2011, while Alabama’s contracted 
significantly in 2011. This increase in Construction GDP, while small denotes 
growth in the construction economy in the state of Oregon (Figure 16).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Construction GDP Alabama vs. Oregon 2011 Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
 
 
 
It can be inferred that although the employment rates are flat and there is not a 
significant increase in the hiring of more workers; there still continues to be an 
availability of work. This is reflected by the increase in construction GDP for 2011, 
which is trending upwards. By the overall spectrum that construction GDP encompasses 
it can be assessed that the economic climate for construction in Oregon is healthy. 
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5.22 Alabama vs. Oregon Construction Spending: Data Gathering 
 
 
Table 43: Construction Spending Alabama and Oregon Per Year Source: U.S Census Bureau 
 
State 2009 2010 2011 
Alabama 7,659 5,568 2,972 
Oregon 1,938 1,349 4,426 
 
 
 
5.23 Alabama vs. Oregon Construction Spending: Analysis and Results 
Oregon saw a reduction in Construction Spending in 2010 from (1,938) to 
(1,349), while in 2011 Construction GDP grew from (1,349) to (4,426) (table 43). The 
T-tests showed a significant change in Construction Spending from 2010 to 2011. 
 
 
Table 44: T-Test Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances: Construction Spending Oregon 2010 and 
2011 
 
Null Hypothesis: There has been no change in the Construction Spending in Oregon 
from 2010 to 2011 
  2010 2011 
Mean 1618.95 3015.70 
Variance 31319.25 854743.59 
Observations 12 12 
Pooled Variance 443031.42 
 Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 DF 22 
 t Stat -5.140 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 3.75E-5 
 t Critical two-tail 2.073873068   
Reject Null Hypothesis: P Value is smaller than 0.05 
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This demonstrates that there is significant change in Oregon Construction 
Spending for the two year span. This is confirmed by the slope intercept lines of the two 
data sets, 2010 (-49.083) and 2011 (256.42); and the P Value in the T-Tests (See table 
44). Although Construction Spending was trending downwards in 2010, the trend line 
exploded upwards in 2011 (See figure 17).  
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: Construction Spending Oregon, 2010 to 2011 Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
 
 
 
The last test determines if there is a significant change in Construction spending 
of Alabama, when compared to Oregon. The T-Test rejects the Null Hypothesis, and as 
such there is a significant change in Construction Spending when the two states are 
compared (table 45). Alabama’s spending has a slope intercept of (-216.33) while 
Oregon has (256.42) (figure 18). 
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Figure 18: Construction Spending Alabama vs. Oregon 2011 Source: U.S. Census Bureau 
 
 
Table 45: T-Test Two-Sample Assuming Unequal Variances: Construction Spending Alabama vs. Oregon 
2011 
 
Null Hypothesis: There has been no significant change in Construction Spending of 
Alabama when compared to Oregon 
  Alabama Oregon 
Mean 4161.833 3015.708333 
Variance 608401.4 854743.5903 
Observations 12 12 
Hypothesized Mean Difference 0 
 DF 21 
 t Stat 3.282305 
 P(T<=t) two-tail 0.003554 
 t Critical two-tail 2.079614   
Reject Null Hypothesis: P Value is smaller than 0.05 
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5.24 Summary of Findings 
Utilizing the employment rates, construction GDP and Construction 
Spending; the data clearly shows that the economy in Oregon has been booming 
since 2011 in the private sector. The data shows (4) major points: 
1. Oregon’s employment rates grew by (1,400) workers in the two-year 
span. 
 Since July 2010 to June 2012, Alabama has lost a cumulative 
14,900 construction jobs. 
2. Employment rates: From July 2011(Passage of Law) to Jun 2012 
have not any had a significant change, from (68.9) to (68.8).  
 After July 2011 Alabama employment rate dropped by (6,800) 
jobs to June 2012.  
3. Construction as part of GDP showed no significant change in the two 
year span. In 2010 it decreased by -6.05% decrease, in 2011 it 
increased 5.83% 
 Construction GDP in the two-year span decreased by almost 
8.5%. In 2010 it decreased by -0.48% while in 2011 it 
decreased by -8.43% 
6. Construction Spending showed a significant change in 2010 and 
2011. In 2010 a -30.39% decrease in which the slope of the line was 
(-49.083) while in 2011 the slope was (256.42) an explosion upwards. 
From (1,349) in 2010 to (4,426), a 228.09% increase. 
82 
 
 Construction Spending in Alabama decreased by 27.3% in 
2010, in 2011 is decreased by 46.6%.  
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6. SURVEY AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 Survey and Interview 
 Data gained from the survey and interviews will help understand the data 
patterns in the quantitative research, as well as the meanings and relationships 
discovered in the data. It is important to understand that this hybrid methodology of 
research is proposed to further explain the relationships in the data. The sampling of the 
survey will focus on sub-contractors. Sub-contractors are picked, since very few General 
Contractors self-perform. The survey will target those companies in the construction 
field that are self-performers. The trades targeted are: concrete, masonry, drywall, 
painting, flooring, and roofing. 
Survey: The survey will be administered in the form of a phone interview; the 
semi-structured interviews with the construction companies will be very similar to the 
survey shown below: 
6.2 Survey: Legislation House Bill 56 
Filter Questions: Any response of NO on the following questions will eliminate 
subjects from project survey. 
1. Are you in charge of hiring and firing at your company or current employer? 
Yes  No 
2. Have you been in this position since January 2010? 
Yes  No 
3. Are you aware of the contents of House Bill 56? 
Yes  No 
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1. Has House Bill 56 had an overall positive effect on construction? 
  Strongly 
Positive 
Positive Neutral Negative Strongly 
Negative 
2. How has Legislation House Bill 56 impacted your labor force? 
Greatly 
Increased 
Increased No Impact Reduced Greatly 
Reduced 
3. House Bill 56 has impacted my ability to procure work by? 
Greatly 
Increasing It 
Increasing It No Impact Decreased It Greatly 
Decreased It 
Do you agree or disagree with the following statements: 
4. Since the announcement of the law I have had difficulties hiring general 
laborers? 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
5. Since the announcement of the law it I have had difficulties hiring foremen or 
supervisory staff? 
Strongly 
Disagree 
Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree 
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6.3 Results 
The following tables numerically account for all responses, in the administered 
survey. The tables are arranged, in two separate sections: 
1. Compiled responses among all trades 
2. Reponses by trade (Appendix D) 
When administering the survey for efficiency the questions were given a numerical 
response. For example, if a questions was answered as strongly negative, it would 
receive a (-2) if neutral it would receive a (0).  
6.3.1 How Data Was Collected 
All data was gathered from the Alabama.Gov website. The type of sub-contractor 
trade to be research was input into the registry of registered contractors with the state of 
Alabama. 
The following numbers correspond to each individual trade: 
Concrete: 
1. Number of companies on the Alabama. Gov. website:  256 
2. The number of companies contacted:    15 
3. The number of respondents who did not pass the filter: 8 
Masonry: 
1. Number of companies on the Alabama. Gov. website: 113 
2. The number of companies contacted:    13 
3. The number of respondents who did not pass the filter: 2  
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Framing: 
1. Number of companies on the Alabama. Gov. website: 73 
2. The number of companies contacted:    16 
3. The number of respondents who did not pass the filter: 0 
Drywall: 
1. Number of companies on the Alabama. Gov. website: 123 
2. The number of companies contacted:    18 
3. The number of respondents who did not pass the filter: 6 
Flooring: 
1. Number of companies on the Alabama. Gov. website: 97 
2. The number of companies contacted:    31 
3. The number of respondents who did not pass the filter: 9 
Painting: 
1. Number of companies on the Alabama. Gov. website: 136 
2. The number of companies contacted:    11 
3. The number of respondents who did not pass the filter: 1 
6.4 Summary 
The approach taken to summarize the findings, will allocate the data into the 
previously determined segments of analysis; which defined as the chosen sub-contractor 
trades. See Appendix D, for full table results. 
Concrete: The data shows that by a majority the sample indicates that HB 56 has 
had a negative impact on the Construction Industry in Alabama. The large majority of 
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sub-contractors in the concrete trade have not had any decrease in their perspective labor 
force, yet half of the sample agrees that the availability of laborers has greatly decreased 
since the passage of HB 56. Sub-Contractors also state that the law has had no impact on 
their availability to procure work, and that part of the business has had no 
impact/change, as well as the hiring of supervisory staff which has not shown any 
impact/neutrality since HB 56 was passed. A contractor’s ability to procure work is 
defined by the contractor’s ability to perform that work it is contracted for. If a 
contractor defines that HB 56 has a negative impact overall, a negative impact on the 
labor force, yet the procurement of work has not changed; this is an inconsistent 
statement. It can be assumed that the contractors who stated the negative aspects of HB 
56, probably hired, or dealt with unauthorized immigrants. This coincides with the 
premise that all participants are not being truthful in their answers. By stating that HB 56 
has had an impact on their respective labor force, it’s paramount to publically stating “I 
hire unauthorized immigrants”. The survey was designed to clarify these conflicting 
responses.  
Masonry: The data points that masonry is the trade that was least affected by the 
passage of the law. The majority of responders answered either neutral or no impact 
when administered the survey. The survey revealed that masonry can be divided into two 
labor forces: 
1. Mason 
2. Laborer (Makes mortar, gets block/brick, cuts masonry, etc.) 
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 Hence most sub-contractors don’t solely rely on laborers to perform work, but 
more skilled craftsmen. Masonry perhaps is by far the trade that uses the most skilled 
labor of the six (6) selected. The literature review and the comments of the respondents 
show that most unauthorized immigrants consist of low skilled to no skill workers. 
Although the data collected shows that half of sub-contractors feel that their ability to 
procure work has diminished, participant stated that this is not necessarily due to HB 56, 
but more to a lack of available work. With that being said the data does not clearly lean 
to a negative or positive effect on all the questioned aspects; it is defined by a no impact 
to neutral overall encompassing response. 
 Framing: This trade by the results has been most affected by HB 56. Half of the 
sampled sub-contractors state that the law has had a strongly negative effect on the 
construction industry, as well as strong agreement that there is a difficulty hiring 
laborers since the passage of the law. While at the same time stating that their ability to 
procure work has neither decreased nor changed. This in itself is a contradictory 
statement, the premise that while law has had a negative impact on the construction 
industry and there is a lack of laborers, while not affecting contractors ability to procure 
work are clashing statements. To be able to understand the dynamics being played in by 
these three questions; we must look at the responses to whether or not contractors have 
had difficulties hiring laborers. Most framing sub-contractors state that laborers are short 
in supply and availability, hence they cannot bid on work that requires more than their 
available labor force. Some of the comments chronicled by the participants’ of the 
survey corroborate the premise that they are weary of bidding work that they cannot 
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handle with their own labor force. This ultimately affects a contractor’s ability to 
procure work. Three (3) respondents explained why framing was the trade most affected 
by HB 56. The following quote is taken from one of the three responses, “since we don’t 
require highly skilled laborers, we require numbers to perform our work, and we can’t 
find people to work”. (New York Times, 2012) 
 The following three (3) trades depict a variety of responses that do not reflect 
either a negative or positive position as it pertains to the effects of HB 56. 
 Drywall: Due to the fluctuations shown by the data sampled, the interpretation of 
the data is defined by two of the five questions asked in the survey. The survey tries to 
encompass all the aspects that HB 56 has impacted. To the initial question that asks if 
HB has had a positive impact on the labor force, there are no majority responses on 
either side. That shows that for the drywall sub-contractor, HB 56 has proven to vary on 
both sides of the spectrum. The question then arises, what are the areas that HB 56 has 
impacted, if the overall impact is determined to be null. Half of respondents agree that 
there is a shortage of labor to be hired. This by their responses does not seem to affect 
either the procurement of work, or their own labor forces. Drywall does not seem to be a 
trade that has been heavily affected at the present moment by HB 56. One (1) respondent 
did provide a reasonable answer to the questions posed. “right now since work is slow, 
our current labor force can handle the amount of work we have, if for some reason work 
would pick up now, we would be in trouble”. (Anonymous) 
 Flooring: Just as drywall, flooring does not lean to either side of the spectrum on 
the passage of the law. It does mostly lean towards a neutral impact of the law; while 
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skew on the negative side, on all questions across the board. Aside from the consensus 
by half of the participants that the labor pool has decreased, the trend is at the neutral or 
no impact. Flooring just by the data results is a trade that has not experienced a decrease 
in its procurement of work. By those standards, HB 56 has not affected the flooring 
industry significantly other than the labor force numbers. 
 Painting: Painting is not a trade that generally requires many workers, or highly 
skilled laborers. The data supports this premise. The results depict that contractors either 
see HB 56 as being either negative or having no impact/neutral. Contractors have not 
noticed any decrease in their existing labor force, by a vast majority; while half agree 
that since the passage of the law the majority conceded that there have been difficulties 
hiring laborers. Across the board contractors agree that there has been no impact on the 
hiring of supervisory staff, this coincides with the premise that painting contractors do 
not typically hire highly skilled workers. The data once again points to what has shown 
true on all trades that were administered the survey, which is HB 56 has had a negative 
impact on construction. Some trades more than others, but across the boards all trades 
have suffered from HB 56.  
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Table 46: Tabulated Results of Survey, Garcia 2013 
 
Tabulated Survey Results 
All Trades      
# 1 Strongly Negative Negative Neutral Positive Strongly Positive 
Total 24 3 18 7 8 
# 2 Greatly Reduced Reduced No 
Impact 
Increased Greatly Increased 
Total 12 4 37 5 2 
# 3 Greatly Decreased 
it 
Decreased it No 
Impact 
Increased 
it 
Greatly Increased 
it 
Total 10 12 29 8 1 
# 4 Strongly Agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly Disagree 
Total 31 7 15 4 3 
# 5 Strongly Agree Agree No 
Impact 
Disagree Strongly Disagree 
Total 4 2 51 3 0 
      
 
 
6.5 Histograms per Trade 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Tabulated Results Concrete Subcontractor, Garcia 2013 
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Figure 20: Tabulated Results Masonry Subcontractor, Garcia 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Tabulated Results Framing Subcontractor, Garcia 2013 
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Figure 22: Tabulated Results Drywall Subcontractor, Garcia 2013 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23: Tabulated Results Flooring Subcontractor, Garcia 2013 
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Figure 24: Tabulated Results Painting Subcontractor, Garcia 2013 
 
 
 
The above histograms clearly show that overall sub-contractors agree by a 
majority that HB 56 has had a negative impact on construction. While not all trades have 
been affected equally, on all trades the majority of responses are based on the negative 
side of the histograms. The following table shows that amount of responses on the 
negative side of the histogram vs. the total amount of responses on the positive side of 
the histograms, per trade. Overwhelmingly the negative responses exceed by almost 
225% the positive responses to HB 56. As seen on table 47.  
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Table 47: Cumulative Responses Positive and Negative Spectrum per Trade, Garcia 2013. 
 
 
Negative Cumulative 
Responses 
Positive Cumulative 
Responses 
16 5 
16 6 
20 8 
15 11 
21 5 
15 6 
Total: 103 Total : 41  
 
 
6.6 Summary Analysis 
The initial part of the study focused on the impact HB 56 has had on three (3) 
aspects of the construction industry in Alabama, employment rates, construction GDP, 
and construction spending. That initial part of the study has shown that Alabama has had 
significant changes in all three of these facets. Although the questions asked in the 
survey were not designed to uncover monetary changes caused by HB 56, which in turn 
could be grouped together with Construction GDP, and Construction Spending; the 
survey did create a platform for analysis of the responses vs. the employment rate.  
 
6.7 Content Analysis 
 Content analysis was done on the responses chronicled below in order to 
summarize the content uncovered into objective evaluations. The initial stage of content 
analysis separated the most used words; or root words, their secondary words, and 
tertiary words (see appendix E for full table). The idea in separating the statements into 
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three parts was to “tree” each statement, first the root word, then the trunk, and finally 
the branches. The key words: (figure 25) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 25: Survey Content Analysis: Root Words 
 
 
 
The words in figure 25 where used 70% of the time, in a negative connotation. 
The secondary most common secondary word is “shortage” and “can’t find”. These two 
words were used 33% of the time, the words were coupled as “shortage” and “can’t 
find” are determined to be the same. While the words “can’t bid”, “not bid”, “negative’, 
‘hit hardest” came up 26%.   
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Force 
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Figure 26: Survey Content Analysis: Secondary + Tertiary Words  
 
 
 
In total 70% of the words that deal with labor, are connected with negative 
connotations. This shows that a majority of surveyed participants deem HB 56 as a 
negatively impacting law. A final content analysis revealed that only 6% of the 
comments chronicled, depicted HB 56 in a positive manner, and overwhelming 94% of 
respondents depicted HB 56 as a negative law.   
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6.7.1 Comments 
 “The shortage of workers, has caused me not to bid on jobs that I normally bid 
on” 
 “Construction crews are not traveling as far as they used to.” 
 “Some legal immigrants are leaving Alabama, just for fear of prosecution.” 
 “I have masons ready to work, but I can’t find laborers (mud, grout, block 
cutting. Etc.) available, so I can’t bid on big work.” 
 “Wrapping labor force, has just plummeted” 
 “Multi framing jobs are being hit the hardest.” 
 “The law is positive for those who were doing legal work to start with, those with 
illegal workers are struggling trying to bid.” 
 “We use E-Verify, so we don’t hire illegals.” 
 “For the past 5 years, the work is slow, but the last year has been very bad.” 
 “Too many experienced workers not enough laborers. Too many hands on the 
cookie jar.” 
 “Hard to find good workers to help, and the Mexicans work hard. I can’t get 
American workers to work how they do.” 
 “The states that are bordering Alabama like Georgia, who use E-Verify don’t 
have work.” 
 “The south west and north east parts of Alabama are having a harder time getting 
work.” 
 “HB 56 has created a negative labor pool.” 
99 
 
 “My work in Fort Bend had decreased by ¼ in the past year. And when I do my 
workers don’t want to go near government facilities.” 
6.8 Final Conclusion 
The results of the qualitative data, depicts what is reinforced by the quantitative 
data. HB 56 has had a negative impact on construction. The drop in employment rates 
coincides with the sub-contractor consensus that there is a shortage of available laborers 
in the marketplace. The reduction in Construction GDP and Construction Spending, 
shows that the amount of work available is decreasing, which is a contradictory to the 
premise that the majority of sub-contractors have not experienced any change in their 
ability to procure work. The question becomes simplistic in nature, if all indexes in the 
construction economy are recessing, if there are no workers available to work; how can a 
sub-contractors capacity to get work not be affected. As chronicled above, due to the 
nature of the questioning, as a researcher I must conclude that the sub-contractors that I 
spoke with have or have hired unauthorized immigrants; and do not want for fear of 
backlash or perception, to be thought of as employers who do so. The last part of the 
qualitative research compiles comments given to me by the sub-contractors I spoke with. 
Due to IRB (Internal Review Board) protocol, I cannot name or link the comments back 
to the participants who said them. They will be labeled anonymous. 
6.9 Researchers Conclusion 
 The driving force behind this thesis was simply to discover the affects that anti-
unauthorized immigration laws have had on the construction industry. Having worked 
for a sub-contractor in Texas, I was not under any illusion on the dependency of the 
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construction industry on unauthorized immigrant workers. Before I began researching 
employment rates, I asked myself, what would happen if all the unauthorized workers 
from my company left? With the United States unemployment rate being in the 8% 
range I thought we would have no problem filling these positions, with American 
workers eager to earn a paycheck and have steady employment. It almost seemed anti-
American to not support a bill like HB 56, knowing the high number of Americans out 
of work or under employed. 
 Yet as the quantitative research was completed and the qualitative survey was 
underway, I began to question my ideas. When performing the literature review, I 
uncovered that a vast majority of anti-unauthorized immigration supporters, have sited 
that illegal immigrants take the jobs of legal workers. That is, if unauthorized 
immigrants vacated those positions, legal workers could in turn fill those positions. The 
fact that after HB 56, Alabama’s’ employment rates continued to regress consistently, 
while not adding jobs in the year following the legislation, raised a red flag. If the 
premise is defined that as soon as positions become available, legal workers will take 
them; that there smooth transition from unauthorized workers being filled by legal 
workers, was just simply not true. The survey comments reinforced what the 
employment rates showed. The labor pool has decreased so much that there are no 
workers to hire; some respondents stated that they were not bidding on work that they 
could possibly get. The difference Construction GDP and Construction Spending 
witnessed in 2011when compared to 2010 was mind boggling. The research ultimately 
made me ask myself several questions; is our idea to eliminate unauthorized 
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immigration, going to cause the same effects to other states as it did Alabama? Have 
other states that enacted similar laws suffered the same as Alabama? To what extent are 
we reliant on unauthorized workers here in the United States? Can the legal work force 
population keep up with the current demands of the construction industry? I was told 
once that good research solves problems, but also raises many more. I hope that the 
research I have performed shows the impact of HB 56 on the construction industry, and 
that future research and researchers take on this vital topic which has propagated intense 
debates within our populace and politicians. 
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APPENDIX A 
Share of Illegal Immigration 
The data provided by the Pew Hispanic Research center shows the percentage in 
the labor force that unauthorized immigrants represent. 
Table 48: Share of Unauthorized Immigrants in the Labor Force Per State. Source: Pew Hispanic Center 
Number and Share for Labor Force of 
Unauthorized Immigrants per State, for 2010 
Labor Force 
 Total (Thousands) U.I.E Share 
U.S Total 154,936 8,000 5.20% 
Alabama 2,263 95 4.2% 
Alaska 358 <10 <1.5% 
Arizona 3,116 230 7.4% 
Arkansas 1,305 40 3.0% 
California 18,811 1,850 9.7% 
Colorado 2,664 120 4.6% 
Connecticut 1,853 85 4.5% 
Delaware 434 20 4.5% 
District of Columbia 339 20 6.1% 
Florida 9,064 600 6.6% 
Georgia 4,777 325 7.0% 
Hawaii 612 30 4.6% 
Idaho 768 20 2.8% 
Illinois 6,719 375 5.6% 
Indiana 3,168 70 2.3% 
Iowa 1,741 55 3.2% 
Kansas 1,417 45 3.3% 
Kentucky 2,081 55 2.6% 
Louisiana 2,068 40 2.0% 
Maine 678 <10 <1% 
Maryland 3,100 190 6.2% 
Massachusetts 3,509 130 3.7% 
Michigan 4,886 100 2.0% 
Minnesota 2,947 60 2.1% 
Mississippi 1,223 35 2.9% 
Missouri 3,057 40 1.3% 
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Montana 513 <10 <1% 
Nebraska 1,006 30 3.0% 
Nevada 1,367 140 10.0% 
New Hampshire 754 10 1.6% 
New Jersey 4,679 400 8.6% 
New Mexico 909 50 5.6% 
New York 9,742 450 4.7% 
North Carolina 4,658 250 5.4% 
North Dakota 375 <10 <0.5% 
Ohio 5,922 70 1.2% 
Oklahoma 1,798 55 3.0% 
Oregon 2,024 110 5.3% 
Pennsylvania 6,264 110 1.7% 
Rhode Island 570 20 3.7% 
South Carolina 2,171 45 2.1% 
South Dakota 443 <10 <1.5% 
Tennessee 3,020 95 3.1% 
Texas 12,261 1,100 9.0% 
Utah 1,359 75 5.4% 
Vermont 360 <10 <0.5% 
Virginia 4,082 160 3.9% 
Washington 3,623 190 5.1% 
West Virginia 769 <10 <0.5% 
Wisconsin 3,093 65 2.0% 
Wyoming 292 <10 <1.5% 
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APPENDIX B 
Construction GDP:  
The data shown by the Bureau of Economic Analysis shows the value added in 
production by the labor and capital located in a state in the construction industry. 
Table 49: Gross Domestic Product by State Source: U.S Department of Commerce: Bureau of Economic Analysis 
2009 & 2010  
Gross Domestic Product by State (millions of current dollars) in: 
Construction 
Area 
GDP  
Current Millions 
2009 Area 
GDP  
Current Millions 
2009 
Alabama 7,654 Montana 1,889 
Alaska 1,889 Nebraska 3,620 
Arizona 12,985 Nevada 8,664 
Arkansas 4,190 New Hampshire 1,801 
California 62,083 New Jersey 15,355 
Colorado 10,289 New Mexico 3,711 
Connecticut 5,944 New York 34,894 
Delaware 1,635 North Carolina 15,067 
District of. Columbia 952 North Dakota 1,381 
Florida 34,644 Ohio 15,022 
Georgia 15,987 Oklahoma 5,202 
Hawaii 3,895 Oregon 6,409 
Idaho 2,661 Pennsylvania 19,131 
Illinois 23,360 Rhode Island 1,990 
Indiana 9,349 South Carolina 7,112 
Iowa 4,833 South Dakota 1,350 
Kansas 4,165 Tennessee 8,274 
Kentucky 5,953 Texas 57,748 
Louisiana 11,158 Utah 5,736 
Maine 1,843 Vermont 913 
Maryland 13,917 Virginia 14,806 
Massachusetts 11,034 Washington 14,283 
Michigan 10,358 West Virginia 2,520 
Minnesota 9,481 Wisconsin 8,383 
Mississippi 4,906 Wyoming 1,812 
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Missouri 9,666   
2010 
Area 
GDP  
Current Millions 
2010 Area 
GDP  
Current Millions 
2010 
Alabama 7,617 Montana 1847 
Alaska 1882 Nebraska 3362 
Arizona 11739 Nevada 6351 
Arkansas 3998 New Hampshire 1761 
California 57387 New Jersey 14714 
Colorado 9369 New Mexico 3441 
Connecticut 5707 New York 33347 
Delaware 1594 North Carolina 14321 
District of. Columbia 930 North Dakota 1432 
Florida 31110 Ohio 14242 
Georgia 15028 Oklahoma 5235 
Hawaii 3653 Oregon 6021 
Idaho 2563 Pennsylvania 18768 
Illinois 21337 Rhode Island 1867 
Indiana 9377 South Carolina 6686 
Iowa 4662 South Dakota 1316 
Kansas 4062 Tennessee 8227 
Kentucky 5572 Texas 55956 
Louisiana 10315 Utah 5555 
Maine 1808 Vermont 915 
Maryland 13327 Virginia 14660 
Massachusetts 10722 Washington 12944 
Michigan 10155 West Virginia 2518 
Minnesota 8952 Wisconsin 7952 
Mississippi 4768 Wyoming 1784 
Missouri 8781   
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APPENDIX C 
Similar Laws: 
The last filter system was designed to determine comparative states that had not 
passed or flirted with the idea of passing laws similar to HB 56. It is imperative to select 
states that similar to Alabama in Construction GDP and share of illegal immigration in 
the labor force. This creates a baseline data from which Alabama can in turn be 
compared, and tested for significant change. 
Table 50: Similar Laws: Stated With Laws Similar to HB 56 and Proposed Similar Legislation 
Source: UCLA School of Law, Hugh & Hazel Darling Law Library: Copycat States 
States with Similar Laws (HB 56) 
State Passed Legislation 
Name of 
Legislation 
Proposed 
Legislation 
Alabama X HB 56  
Alaska    
Arkansas   X 
Arizona X SB 1070  
California    
Colorado    
Connecticut    
Delaware   X 
Florida   X 
Georgia X HB 87  
Hawaii    
Idaho   X 
Illinois X HB 6937  
Indiana X SN 0590  
Iowa    
Kansas   X 
Kentucky   X 
Louisiana   X 
Maine    
Maryland    
Massachusetts   X 
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Michigan   X 
Minnesota X HF 3830  
Mississippi X SB 1070  
Missouri   X 
Montana    
Nebraska    
Nevada   X 
New Hampshire    
New Jersey    
New Mexico    
New York    
North Carolina   X 
North Dakota    
Ohio   X 
Oklahoma X HB 1804  
Oregon    
Pennsylvania X HB 2476  
Rhode Island X H 8142  
South Carolina X HB 4919  
South Dakota X HB 1199  
Tennessee X SB 1070  
Texas   X 
Utah X HB 70  
Vermont    
Virginia X HB 2332  
Washington    
West Virginia    
Wisconsin   X 
Wyoming X HB 94  
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APPENDIX D 
Table 51: HB 56 Survey: Concrete 
Tabulated Results: Concrete 
Question 1 Strongly 
Negative 
Negative Neutral Positive Strongly 
Positive 
 6 0 2 0 2 
Question 2 Greatly 
Reduced 
Reduced No Impact Increased Greatly 
Increased 
 2 0 7 1 0 
Question 3 Greatly 
Decreased it 
Decreased it No Impact Increased it Greatly 
Increased it 
 3 0 7 0 0 
Question 4 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
 5 0 3 0 2 
Question 5 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree No Impact Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
 0 0 10 0 0 
Table 52: HB 56 Survey: Masonry 
Tabulated Results: Masonry 
Question 1 Strongly 
Negative 
Negative Neutral Positive Strongly 
Positive 
 4 0 3 2 1 
Question 2 Greatly 
Reduced 
Reduced No Impact Increased Greatly 
Increased 
 2 1 6 0 1 
Question 3 Greatly 
Decreased it 
Decreased 
it 
No Impact Increased it Greatly 
Increased it 
 3 1 5 0 1 
Question 4 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
 6 2 1 1 0 
Question 5 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree No Impact Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
 1 1 8 0 0 
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Table 53: HB 56 Survey: Framing 
Tabulated Results: Framing 
Question 1 Strongly 
Negative 
Negative Neutral Positive Strongly 
Positive 
 5 0 3 1 1 
Question 2 Greatly 
Reduced 
Reduced No Impact Increased Greatly 
Increased 
 4 0 4 1 1 
Question 3 Greatly 
Decreased it 
Decreased it No Impact Increased it Greatly 
Increased it 
 0 4 4 2 0 
Question 4 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
 5 2 2 0 1 
Question 5 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
 0 0 9 1 0 
Table 54: HB 56 Survey: Drywall 
Tabulated Results: Drywall 
Question 1 Strongly 
Negative 
Negative Neutral Positive Strongly 
Positive 
 3 1 3 2 1 
Question 2 Greatly 
Reduced 
Reduced No Impact Increased Greatly 
Increased 
 2 0 6 2 0 
Question 3 Greatly 
Decreased it 
Decreased it No Impact Increased it Greatly 
Increased it 
 2 1 5 2 0 
Question 4 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
 5 0 3 2 0 
Question 5 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
 1 0 7 2 0 
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Table 55: HB 56 Survey: Flooring 
Tabulated Results: Flooring 
Question 1 Strongly 
Negative 
Negative Neutral Positive Strongly 
Positive 
 3 1 3 1 2 
Question 2 Greatly 
Reduced 
Reduced No Impact Increased Greatly 
Increased 
 1 2 6 1 0 
Question 3 Greatly 
Decreased it 
Decreased it No Impact Increased it Greatly 
Increased it 
 1 4 4 1 0 
Question 4 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
 5 2 3 0 0 
Question 5 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
 1 1 8 0 0 
Table 56: HB 56 Survey: Painting 
Tabulated Results: Painting 
Question 1 Strongly 
Negative 
Negative Neutral Positive Strongly 
Positive 
 3 1 4 1 1 
Question 2 Greatly 
Reduced 
Reduced No Impact Increased Greatly 
Increased 
 1 1 8 0 0 
Question 3 Greatly 
Decreased it 
Decreased it No Impact Increased it Greatly 
Increased it 
 1 2 4 3 0 
Question 4 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
 5 1 3 1 0 
Question 5 Strongly 
Agree 
Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly 
Disagree 
 1 0 9 0 0 
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APPENDIX E 
Table 57: Content Analysis of Survey Comments, Garcia 2013. 
Content Analysis 
Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Shortage Workers Not bid 
Traveling Far Crews 
Prosecution Leaving Legal Workers 
Shortage Laborers Cant bid 
Labor Force Plummeted Shortage 
Hardest Multi Framing Jobs 
Positive Legal Illegal Struggling 
E-verify Don’t Hire Illegals 
Work Slow Bad 
Workers Not Enough Laborers 
Workers Mexicans work Hard Can’t find  
E-Verify Work Don’t Have 
SW+ NE Alabama Work Hard Time 
HB 56 Negative Laborers 
Work Decreased Near government 
 
Table 58: Use of Negative Connotations, Garcia 2013 
# of Negative Words 
   Work/Workers/Labor 
Force/Jobs Shortage Not Traveling Prosecution 
 
Shortage Cant Bid Plummeted 
 
Shortage 
Hardest 
Reduced Slow 
 
Bad Not Enough Can’t Find 
 
Don’t Have Hard Time Negative 
 
Decreased 
      # of Positive Words 
E-Verify Positive Helps  Legal Work 
